US Foreign Policy During the Georgian-Russo War of 2008 (Essay Sample)

US foreign policy during the Georgian-Russo war of 2008
The US foreign policy during the Georgian-Russo war of 2008
The anxieties in Georgia date back to the early 1920s when there were unsuccessful attempts made by South Ossetia to declare its own independence CITATION Geo091 \l 1033 (Donovan, 2009). However, these attempts were futile as the entire region remained independent within the Soviet Georgia after the Red Army had taken down Georgia. In 1989, South Ossetia campaigned for the independence of merging the area with North Ossetia in Russia. Later on in 1990, conflict ensued once more following the move by Georgia's proclamation of self-rule from Soviet Union alongside the totalitarian attempts by Georgia’s former president. January 1991 saw the breaking out between South Ossetia and Georgia an occurrence that led to the violence that led to about 2000-4000 deaths and mass displacements and evacuation from their homeland CITATION Geo091 \l 1033 (Donovan, 2009).
As an attempt to avert future disputes and bring peace to the delicate region, Russia orchestrated a cease-fire. As a result, the Russian, Ossetian and Georgian peacekeeping units set up camps around Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital, in a security zone. This was the central point form where the peacekeeping mission would be facilitated, and all issues addressed. These units comprised of a total of 1100 troops derived from the three states. They comprised of about 530 Russians, 300 Georgians, and 300 North Ossetians CITATION Joh121 \l 1033 (Dunlop, 2012). Members of the organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe were tasked with conducting most of the patrol. The settlement of this conflict was superficially facilitated by a joint control commission that comprised of members of the affected nations with facilitation from the OSCE. Some estimates point to a case whereby about 20000 ethnic Georgians occupied approximately a half of the entire province with 25000 ethnic Ossetians left to reside in the remaining areas. The skirmishes of 1990s had caused many to flee while others migrated.
During all this time, some commentators cautioned that Russia's rising influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as the years passed by had greatly led to the transformation of the separatists squabbles into essentially Russia-Georgia disputes CITATION Joh121 \l 1033 (Dunlop, 2012).majority of the dwellers in South Ossetia and Georgia had allegedly been issued with Russian identification and passports, and many of them seemed to support the proposition that their provinces be part of Russia.
In late 2003, Mikheil Saakashvili took over leadership in the supposed "rose revolution" CITATION Joh121 \l 1033 (Dunlop, 2012). Mikheil pledged to implement economic and democratic reforms as well as to regain the central government control over the opponents regions. The new president started his rule by exerting more pressure on South Ossetia. He went on to tauten border controls and halting a large-scale smuggling scheme in the region. Reportedly, the looming smuggle instituted by corrupt Georgian officials and organized Russian criminals. Additionally, several hundreds of mercenaries and intelligence specialists were dispatched into South Ossetia. Georgia defended its actions that it was only fortifying its peacekeeping delegation up to the limit permitted by the truce concession of up to 500 troops. Reportedly, Georgian guerilla warriors also infiltrated the area. Officials of the Russian government further went on to assist paramilitary elements picked from the Trasnistria, Abkhazia and Russia to enter CITATION Sva091 \l 1033 (Cornell & Starr, 2009). Both sides had withdrawn a majority of the paramilitary and the guerillas following the inconclusive clashes in later periods of 2004. Trouble was seemingly far from ending following the unexpected turn of events.
Mikheil, the president, divulged another peace deal meant for South Ossetia in July 2005. The plan presented considerable independence and freedom alongside a multi-stage settlement that consisted of economic reconstruction, demilitarization, and political reconciliation. However, Eduard Kokoiti who was the South Ossetian president rejected the plan proclaiming that the people of South Ossetia were citizens of Russia CITATION Ale11 \l 1033 (Astrov, 2011). Despite the rejection from the Ossetia president, Mikheil's peace strategy received massive support by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe council in early December 2005.
The international support that Kokoiti gained tendered a southern peace proposition that equally visualized certain standards while still presuming independence for South Ossetia. A referendum was held in November 2006 which aimed at the reaffirmation of South Ossetia's sovereignty from Georgia. Reports by the separatists indicated 95% of the 55000 registered voters turned out with 99% voting to approve the referendum CITATION Geo091 \l 1033 (Donovan, 2009). Koikoit was also reelected as president in a separate vote. The results were declined by the US state department and the OSCE. Another voting conducted among the racial Georgians in South Ossetia, some South Ossetians and those displaced from South Ossetia, a referendum was held and it equally approved the Georgian territorial with Dmitriy Sanakoyev, a pro-Georgian being elected governor of South Ossetia. The following year saw a lot of transition and changing focusing on the states and the leadership.
In March 2007 Mikheil submitted another peace scheme for South Ossetia which entailed the creation of transnational managerial districts across the entire region apparently under Sanakoyev's reign, which was to be represented by a delegate at JCC or in other alternative peace consensus. In July of the same year, Saakashvili commanded the institution of a commission to design and work out South Ossetia's position as part of Georgia. The JCC finally commissioned a meeting later in October 2007 in Tbilisi, Georgia, but the Russian ministry of Foreign affairs later professed that Georgian delegates present had made unsatisfactory stipulations and demands aimed at sabotaging the outcomes of the meeting. After that, the parties did not hold any other meeting.
In the second half of July 2008, Russia undertook a military activity that manifested to be a preparation for the forthcoming actions in Georgia later on. This exercise, coded Caucasus 2008, was undertaken by over 8000 mercenaries and was undertaken near the border between Georgia and Russia CITATION Geo091 \l 1033 (Donovan, 2009). One of the scenarios was made up of an imaginary attack by unidentified troops on of South Ossetia and Abkhazia which were Georgia's breakaway regions. The Russian mercenaries’ retaliated by sea air and land to reinforce their "peacekeepers" positioned in their regions as well as offer humanitarian aid and protect the Russian citizens. The action led to massive protests by Georgia’s governance claiming that the demonstration portrayed an invasion threat. As a counter measure to the Russian activity, a combination of about 1000 US mercenaries, 600 Georgian army men and other mercenaries from Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan undertook a similar exercise in Georgia. The exercise was code-named immediate response 2008 CITATION Sva091 \l 1033 (Cornell & Starr, 2009). Its main aim was to increase troop interoperability for the NATO coalition actions and operations in Iraq. However, during the conflict outbreak later in 2008 majority of the units had already left Georgia.
July 3, 2008, had tensions escalate once more. On this day, a proponent of the Georgian government in South Ossetia, Dmitriy Sanakoyev, survived afflication from a roadside mine while a village police chief died in a bomb attack. On that night, the South Ossetians and Georgians launched attacks on each other's checkpoints and villages. The events of the night led to the death and injury of dozens of civilians. As a result, the European Union, Council of Europe and the OSCE collaboratively immediately called on both sides to restart peace talks and restraint.
Later on July 8, 2008, Russia dispatched four military planes were sent to fly over South Ossetia's airspace. This incursion was described as a move to discourage the launch of forthcoming attacks by Georgia on the region. The Georgian administration, however, criticized the assault claiming that it had contravened the concession alleging that the move violated the territorial integrity and agreements. Three days later, it ordered back its ambassador to Russia for "consultations". A privately held meeting of July 21, 2008, saw the UN security council discuss the over flights and even though no concession was arrived at, Georgian emissaries went on to allege that the session had been successful. Conversely, the Russian envoy expressed his displeasure with some of the Security Council members with what he claimed to be "pro-Georgian bias" CITATION Uml121 \l 1033 (Umland, 2012).
There was a series of attacks that followed later on. On July 25, 2008, a bomb blast in Tskhinzali in South Ossetia led to the death of one person. Five days later, the two sides exchanged artillery fire once more whereby the Georgians shelled two Ossetian villages, and the South Ossetians shelled a Georgian built road on a hill outside Tskhinvali CITATION Geo091 \l 1033 (Donovan, 2009). The attacks led to multiple injuries on both ends. The international community went on to express dissatisfaction and fears on the violence, and this prompted a series of actions that were aimed at harnessing the clashes by bringing a lifelong solution. A day after the Russian aerial assault, Condoleezza Rice, the secretary of state at the time had arrived in Georgia for discourse on the appropriate ways of diffusing the rising pressures between Russia and Georgia. In he...