The Democracy Lead to Less Conflict in Fragile States? (Essay Sample)

Does Democracy Lead To Less Conflict In Fragile States?
by (Student’s Name)
Foundation Course-Employee Engagement Unit SHR030-6 1
Tutor: (Instructor’s Name)
Institution’s Name
Department
18th April 2013
Does Democracy Lead To Less Conflict In Fragile States?
There is admittedly no internationally accepted definition for a fragile state. Different authors have defined a fragile state differently. For instance, Kaplan (2008, p. 11) defines a fragile state as “Any state highly unlikely in its current form, even if blessed in the future by better leaders and policies, to be able to cultivate the kind of state bodies that can manage an effective process of development.” The Great Britain Parliament (2012, p. 15) describes it as a state whose legitimacy and or capacity is weak or fragile, and its government cannot deliver its core functions as expected of a state; security and justice are some of the functions that a state should deliver.
There is lack of a formal definition of a fragile state, and most development agencies default the OECD DAC’s 2007 document for its definition. This document posits the attributes of a fragile state as, a state that is deficient of political will, and/or inability to provide elementary functions needed for poverty reduction (Mcloughlin, 2009, p. 9). States are fragile when their structures can no longer promote development, safeguard their citizens’ human rights, and guarantee security. François and Sud (2006, p. 149) make further distinctions between a failed state and fragile state; they suggest that a state is considered a failed state when it is no longer able to meet the security needs of the majority of its population and provide for the basic needs of its population. Barnett (2004, p. 504) argues against what he terms as juxtaposing liberalism and democracy; he contends the results arrived at, and calls for proper definitive boundaries for proper study. The state has few if any functional state institutions and the government losses its legitimacy locally and internationally. When a fragile state is unable to pull itself together, it becomes a failed state. The 1994 Rwandan Genocide is an excellent example of a fragile state, which turned into a failed state; the then government failed to provide adequate security to its peoples. This resulted in the massacre of hundreds of people on the grounds of ethnicity, which ended with the intervention of external forces that restored stability (Great Britain Parliament, 2012, p. 7).
Policy makers and scholars alike have assumed for a long time that fiscal liberalization has a positive influence and inspires developing countries to become more democratic. ‘Fragile states’ have a high propensity to ending up as future failed states (François and Sud, 2006, p. 147). Horowitz, (2006, p. 95) asserts that liberalization does not automatically lead to democracy, a position Rundra (2005, p. 704) concurs with and acknowledges the existence of a relationship between liberalization and democracy. There is not enough evidence available to confirm democracy leads to less conflict in fragile states. If all other factors are held constant, autocracies and democracies stood an equivalent chance at democratic tendencies in considering the findings. Interestingly, it was the regimes with a mixture of the two forms (autocracies and democracies) with the democratic factor outweighing the autocracy that had a seven times higher failure likelihood. Scholars too do not agree on the effects of democracy on fragile states as the results are mixed, and no study has yet pinned it down to either of the two (Horowitz, 2006, p. 92; François and Sud, 2006, p. 147).
With China as an example, scholars have failed to agree on the role played by democracy in development. China, is not considered a democracy, yet is not a fragile state; the country has a strong economy and provides the necessary state functionaries (François and Sud, 2006, p. 147). Several visible cases have been presented where democracy has led to states being more politically repressive. Among the examples given are states like Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and Peru. Other countries such as Ghana, Thailand, and Turkey have increased or reduced these freedoms (Rudra, 2005, p. 704). Costa Rica was the only consistent country while other less developed countries declined with the onset of globalization.
When external countries exert democratic tendencies on a fragile state, it results in more conflicts and stress within the fragile state. This has led to the assertion that democracy should be ingrown and not imposed on a state. Imported Democracy, which Barnett (2004, p. 514) infers as “We” and “Them” does not turn out well as seen with Iraq, which is one of the latest examples of countries with imported democracy. After president Saddam’s government was overthrown, there has been a concerted effort to restore sanity to the country. To date, Iraq is still a struggling state, which is yet to attain democracy (François and Sud, 2006, p. 148). The people seem to be even more divided than they were before external intervention. The intervention purposed to bring about democracy in what was at the time considered a fragile state; this measure did not succeed and led to the collapse of the state. Practicing democratic politics cannot save a state, which is unable to deliver its functionaries. This implies that democracy in itself cannot safeguard a fragile state against conflict. Its presence would enhance and legitimize the leadership, but it does not guarantee lesser conflict as witnessed in the post Saddam Iraq.
Afghanistan is another example, which has since developed a resistance to the occupation forces that were initially welcomed with open arms. The foreign forces are now viewed as intruders whose exit cannot come soon enough. This view emanates in part from the fact that the troops have taken up the functions of the government; they are providing services, which are the mandate of the government (Johnson, 2011, p. 302). The foreign forces use their expatriate proxies and sideline the legitimate government; this makes the government appear like a puppet.
Evidence proves that democracy does not lead to less conflict in a fragile state. It is necessary to appreciate the fact that fragile states are just that, fragile. Their potential or propensity to slide into failed states is significant, much as they are still capable of growing into fully-fledged democracies. Several factors work together with democracy to avert conflict in a fragile state. These are best considered when looking at the reasons states would fail despite being considered democratic. Less developed countries are more inclined to become fragile states; this by extrapolation portends that a state’s economy influences democracy.
Even where a state is democratic, numerous factors can tip the scales towards conflict as long as the state is fragile. Some of the instances that may lead to or exacerbate conflict in fragile but democratic states include maladministration by the indigenous elites; this is a recipe for tipping the scales, democracy notwithstanding. Paranoid elites who wished to strengthen their lease on power perpetuated the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Interference from foreign powers and subsequent desertion has a negative impact on fragile democracies. The international community intervened and walked out on Rwanda without resolution; this worsened an already distressing situation. Such scenarios lead to steadily deteriorating terms of trade with the poor and adversely affected state. Authoritarianism and militarism are also factors that would derail an otherwise democratic state (Hazel, 2013, p. 126). The people get to a point where they reject or resent the authority leading to civil disobedience.
The presence of civil conflict in neighboring countries has the potential to turn the tables of a democratic, but fragile state (François and Sud, 2006, p. 146). Nepal’s democratic experiments ended by exerting strain on the fragile government and weakened it even further; this virtue is common to fragile states (Hutt, 2004, p. 164). Some fragile states have trudged on with the support and assistance of peacekeeping forces; the forces have helped these nations to maintain stability as they recover from the post war effects. Peacekeeping forces come with donor funding to fragile or failed states (Goel, 2009, p. 293). This has the detrimental factor of raising the costs of basic commodities such as housing and affects the poor adversely. The departure of the peacekeeping forces depletes the once abundant resources the state had become accustomed to; this makes it readjustment difficult because of the resultant severe, but necessary budgetary cuts. The foreign agencies hand over power and the provision of basic amenities to the government before leaving; this includes the provision of security, which had been previously provided by the peacekeepers. The government is supposed to provide all these necessities with a constrained budget (Paulais, 2012, p. 140).
The Australian government drafted the laws of Papua New Guinea, despite the country having a democratically elected parliament and legitimate government. Such inclinations undermine the fragile democracy’s hold on power, and they may lead to the worsening of the state. The presence of external parties creates a foreign footprint, and it gets worse when they inadvertently usurp the authority of the legitimate government. They deliver aid directly to the recipients bypassing the government, which is mandated with the provision of such services. This diminishes the government&rsq...