The Logical Problem of Evil (Essay Sample)

THE LOGICAL PROBLEM OF EVIL
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The Logical Problem of Evil
The logical problem of evil (LPE) has been defined in mainstream conceptual philosophy as an attempt to show that an omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good living creature can possibly exist in a cosmos with evil. The accepted rationale is that an all-good Deity would desire to totally remove all evil; an all-powerful Deity could completely suppress all evil, and the omniscient Deity would know how to accomplish it. Therefore, if God existed, the world would be free of evil. Regrettably, evil exists, and thus the concept of there being a god is not valid.
Epicurus is frequently regarded as the originator of LPE. David Hume cited him as having posited, “Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent. Is he able but not willing? Then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?” The problem of evil, however does not only concern philosophers but theologists as well as evidenced in the subsequent discussion. Indeed Paul Ricoeur argued that both philosophy and theology experience evil as a unique challenge. This paper attempts to explain the concept underlying the problem of evil. The essay will also discuss the LPE’s history within the conceptual analysis of religion and a summary of prominent replies to the problem. The paper then concludes with its contention that Epicurus’ assertion does not weaken the concept of the Christian God.[David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 1779.] [Paul Ricoeur, Evil: A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology (Continuum, 2007).]
Epicurus examined all four plausible choices for God’s capacity and willingness to dislodge evil from the world, as customary in the period. It is important to acknowledge that Epicurus was reacting to apparent evil in the universe to comprehend the problem. There would be no need to debate if there was no evil. Consequently, four alternatives emerge: God is either inclined but incapable of preventing evil, able but unwilling, both willing and able, or neither able nor inclined.
Like Epicurus’ approach, one must assess these possibilities in turn. God is not almighty if he is both inclined and incapable. Mackie concurs with this evaluation when he opines that there are no constraints to what an all-powerful being can do. Many people believe that this is the simple interpretation of omnipotence; anything else would be, at best, semi-omnipotence. Mackie concedes that this alternative will not concern those who think of God in unconventional ways. However, it is not a possibility for the overwhelming bulk of religious people.[Michael L. Peterson and J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,”