The Negotiation In Cuban Missile Crisis (Research Paper Sample)

Negotiation is a series of events that culminate and reinforces beliefs and perception and ideally ends with involved parties reaching an agreement although in some instances it can end with one party walking away (Malhotra, 2016). The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 presents a perfect example of a historic negotiation situation which was concluded as a result of parties involved leveraging strategic tactics to come to terms of agreement (Kremenyuk, 2009). The negotiation occurred in 1962 after the Soviet Union provided ballistic missiles to Cuba resulting in one of the most dangerous confrontations between the Soviet Union and the United States, and which brought the world to the brink of full-blown nuclear war (Mikoian, 2012). The Soviet Union and United States leaders utilized these tactics to reach an agreement that ended the crisis and averted what could have been the start of nuclear war, and which would have led to mass casualties, injuries, destruction of property, and other devastating consequences for the entire world (McKeown, 2001).
In order to better understand how the Soviet Union and United States leaders leveraged strategic negotiation methods to reach an agreement, it is important to first discuss the background of the Cuba Missile Crisis (Kremenyuk, 2009). The origin of this crisis is traced to the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17 1961, in which 1,400 Cuban exiles with the help of the United States, unsuccessfully launched an invasion at the Bay of Pigs on the south coast of Cuba. This invasion was aimed at fomenting an uprising against the then Cuban leader, Fidel Castro who had come to power through an armed revolt that overthrew Fulgencio Batista (McKeown, 2001). However, the uprising against Castro failed because the Cuban armed forces overpowered the US-backed uprisers. Following the invasion, Castro turned to the Soviet Union for support and protection against internal and external aggression, particularly from the United States. Soviets agreed to offer support and provided Cuba with nuclear weapons (Malhotra, 2016). The offer came with the condition that this deal remains secret until the missiles become fully operational. The then Soviet Union leader, Nikita Khrushchev, claimed that the Soviet support to Cuba was motivated by the desire to safeguard the Cuban Revolution against any form of aggression from the United States, and the aim of changing the global balance of power in favor of the Soviets (Mikoian, 2012).
In spite of the Soviets and Cuba plan to keep their nuclear weapon deal a secret, the United States obtained intelligence information about the deal. The US sent U-2 spy plane flights over Cuban territory in October 1962 (Mikoian, 2012). The flights revealed the presence of missile installation sites, a discovery that inaugurated what was called the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US was fully aware of the enormous strategic implications of these weapons, mainly their ability to easily reach targets within the US territories, including Washington DC and New York City (McKeown, 2001). The then administration of John F Kennedy established a naval blockade aimed at preventing Soviet from supplying Cuba with additional missiles. The Kennedy administration also demanded the immediate withdrawal of the nuclear weapons that had already been delivered to Cuba (Kremenyuk, 2009). The danger posed by this direct confrontational approach by the US was that if the Soviets refused to remove the missiles, the US would resort to escalating the crisis by launching air strikes over Cuba to destroy the missile sites (McKeown, 2001). The US drew up contingency plans for invasion of Cuba if the demands to remove the missiles were not met. The contingency plan also contained a nuclear attack option on the Soviet Union if the latter decided to respond militarily to demands by Kennedy’s administration (Malhotra, 2016).
The Cuba Missiles Crisis situation not only threatened the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union but also brought the world to the verge of a full-scale nuclear war (Mikoian, 2012). The alternative to this possible dangerous consequence was negotiation aimed at averting devastating outcomes for the two countries and for the whole world. Considering the magnitude of the situation, neither leader was able to walk away and reaching an agreement over the crisis was the only option (Malhotra, 2016). It was a standoff whereby an agreement had to be arrived at in order to avoid the start of nuclear war. Like in most negotiation situations, neither party in the Cuba Missiles Crisis had comprehensively understood their bargaining strengths (McKeown, 2001). They only realized their strengths after events had started unfold that there was no actual basis for reaching an agreement over the nuclear weapons. Both parties thus had to take a step back to consider other alternatives. This move was based on the best Alternative To No Agreement principle of negotiation (BATNA) (Kremenyuk, 2009).
Using the prism of the principle of BATNA, Soviet Premier Khrushchev can be described as the seller while US President Kennedy can be viewed as the buyer. The former was trying to sell the idea that the Soviet Union cannot be dominated by the United States (Malhotra, 2016). He argued that Soviet Union was justified to take the actions that it did to support Cuba in response to the US placing nuclear missiles in Turkey, a move that had threatened Soviet Union power. The Soviet Union had established a military and economic relationship with Cuba, which was primarily anchored on a common political economy ideology of communism (Mikoian, 2012). Communism was a counter ideology to United States and its allies’ ideology of capitalism. Following the failed attempt to overthrow Castro’s regime by the Cuban exiles with support of the United States, Khrushchev and Castro agreed that Russia should place nuclear missiles in Cuba as a deterrent measure against future US or US-supported attacks (Kremenyuk, 2009). It was also a move to redress the imbalance of power in the international system caused by America placing its missiles in Turkey. Using the BATNA principle, US is viewed as the buyer who resists the seller’s actions while establishing negotiating positions and ploys aimed at getting the “best deal” out of this process (McKeown, 2001).
The Cuban Missile Crisis negotiation employed various modern negotiation principles and techniques to come to terms of agreement. Planning is a critical step in negotiation, which aims at aligning the negotiation team to an informed and structured approach; the party that better utilizes negotiation plan is more likely to achieve better outcomes from the negotiation process (Kremenyuk, 2009). Khrushchev acted on impulse or emotions instead of following a well-researched plan as evidenced by arranging for nuclear missiles to be transported to Cuba secretly without the knowledge of the United States (Mikoian, 2012). When the United States learned about these missiles, they imposed a blockade to stop further transportation of missiles from Soviet Union to Cuba. At this point Khrushchev was blind and was not aware of what Kennedy was planning about the nuclear operation. The planning mismatch between the two parties suggest that neither party had a clear view on how to initially negotiate for a solution to the crisis (Malhotra, 2016).