History Research: Personality and Stalin‘s Rise to Power (Research Paper Sample)

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Personality and Stalin‘s Rise to Power
Introduction
The events of the 1920s and 1930s continue to attract the curiosity of contemporary historians and scholars interested in understanding the dynamics that came into play to catapult Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) into the echelons of power. Although Stalin continues to be viewed by many as a divisive and ruthless figure based on the purges, gulags and famines that left millions of Russian citizens dead, it is clear that several historians have focused on understanding the statesman’s swift rise to power, particularly in terms of how he managed to outwit the hugely more talented and deserving Leon Trotsky to become Lenin’s political successor (Khlevniuk 108; Pereira 16-17). In 1922, when Vladimir Lenin suffered the first of a succession of strokes that led to his incapacitation, few Russians would have predicted that Stalin would rise to power and become the sole leader of the Communist Part due to his lack of charisma or the oratorical brilliance associated with Trotsky. Consequently, other leading political figures in the Party concentrated their efforts on preventing Trotsky from gaining control over the party and never considered Stalin as a worthy challenger, preferring to refer to him as the ‘grey blur’ (Dukes 15; Smith 326). However, by 1929, Stalin had emerged as the exclusive leader of the Communist Party, signaling his rise to power in a contest that was dominated by political heavyweights such as Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev (Black 71; Plamper 41). The present paper argues that Stalin’s personality and the “cult of personality” concept were instrumental factors in his rise to power as they acted to legitimize his authority among the Russian masses, tame political opponents within Russia, and develop a working relationship with global leaders.
Understanding the Cult of Personality
Many scholars of Russian history discuss Stalin using the “cult of personality” phrase, which was established by Nikita Khrushchev to denounce Stalin and Stalinism during the Twentieth Communist Party Congress held in 1956. One particular scholar argues that the “cult of personality” is an old, elusive expression that “was used by Khrushchev as a criticism of the system of arbitrary one-man rule established by Stalin, rather than of any personality that engendered and maintained that system” (Wingrove 18). Another scholar cites Khrushchev denouncing Stalin’s “cult of personality” as a psychosis that had little association with the main tenets of the Soviet ideology and was only aimed at supporting the glorification of Stalin’s own person using all available methods (Khlevniuk 111). Still, another scholar argues that “the cult was designed to serve as a mechanism for political mobilization by advancing a larger-than-life hero capable of embodying the power, legitimacy and appeal of the Soviet experiment” (Brandenberger 250). However, although Khrushchev never dug too deeply into the personality of Stalin as he was only interested in portraying Stalin’s one-man rule as anti-Leninist, it is clear from the historical evidence adduced so far that Stalin was endowed with unique personality traits that influenced his rise to power. Here, it is important to differentiate the “cult of personality” entrenched by Khrushchev to discount Stalin and the “personality traits” that defined the leader and fueled his rise to power. Consequently, the next section attempts to demonstrate how Stalin’s known personality traits (e.g., special qualities, mediation skills, and capacity to gauge the mood of ordinary Party members) were of particular importance in his ascent to power. Afterwards, the paper will focus on establishing how the “cult of personality” played a leading role in catapulting Stalin’s rise to power.
Stalin’s Personality and the Rise to Power
Historical accounts underscore the fact that Stalin had special qualities that “prompted Lenin to have him appointed to the Central Committee as early as 1913” (Pereira 17). This author argues that Stalin’s personality attributes, including shrewd judgment, a fine memory, common sense and an uncanny sense of timing, made Lenin to develop confidence in Stalin that he could be relied more for the most difficult party tasks irrespective of the fact that he was little known prior to his ascension to the Central Committee. The author further notes that Stalin‘s “poor education and ungrammatical Russian worked to his advantage because they made him appear to be more a man of the people, especially in comparison with the silver tongued Jews, Trotsky, and Zinoviev” (Pereira 17). As such, it can be argued that Stalin’s personal attributes were instrumental in endearing him to Lenin and the common Russian people, hence his rise to power. These special personality attributes enabled Stalin to play off different factions within the Party leadership against each other, with the most common example being how Stalin formed a three-man leadership team with Kamenev and Zinoviev to force Trotsky’s resignation as Commissioner for War in 1925 (Black 72; Pyzhikov 12-13). Consequently, it can be argued that Stalin’s special personality qualities played a significant role in helping him to become a skilful political operator who endeared himself to those who mattered in the Russian political landscape while fighting off political opponents.
Stalin’s personality goes beyond special qualities to a predisposition to act to be the mediator among conflicting political heavyweights, particularly when clashing aspirations in the leadership endangered party unity. To reinforce this argument, it could be recalled that Stalin offered to step down from the party’s leadership in the twelfth Party Congress in 1923 and the fifteenth Party Congress in 1927 (Pereira 17). This gesture, though perceived as predatory and tactical in some quarters, was effective in endearing Stalin to the Russian population by neutralizing the self-promotion values that characterized established political players such as Zinoviev and Kamenev. As various members of the Politburo took conflicting political positions depending on the posts they held in the Party, Stalin took upon himself to act as the supreme arbitrator in inter-institutional conflicts as well as the lead initiator of important decisions affecting the Party and the Russian population (Khlevniuk 113). Stalin’s effective mediation skills and his central role in defending the interests of the state were instrumental in his rise to the epitome of Russian politics, giving credence to the assertion that his personality played a decisive role in legitimizing his authority as an astute political operative destined to protect the interests of the Russian population. As a matter of fact, some historians have suggested Stalin’s seemingly effective mediation skills were a demonstration of his shrewdness or astuteness in playing with other leaders of the Party to ensure political survival (Dukes 16; Varga-Harris 3-5).
Other historical accounts have attempted to analyze particular personality traits that differentiated Stalin and fueled his rise to power. Here, one particular scholar argues that “Stalin relied on what he perceived to be his gift of foresight and his own infallibility” (Khlevniuk 115). These personal attributes, which were perceived in almost mystical terms, were instrumental in not only fueling obstinacy and resistance to compromise that characterized Stalin’s firm grip on power in the late 1930s, but also in entrenching the leader’s pragmatic approaches to domestic and foreign policy. For example, it is evident that Stalin’s foresight and pragmatism in foreign policy enabled him to prevent the deepening of crises, as happened when he supported the North Koreans in a war against the south. Another scholar argues that Stalin had extra-ordinary personal self-control and was steadfast and purposeful in guiding the masses on the laborious path to Communism (Wingrove 18).
It is also clear that Stalin was much better that his political opponents at gauging the mood of the regular Party members and resisting the arrogance demonstrated by other political figures, hence achieving effectiveness in drawing support from the masses. Here, it can be argued that Stalin scored political marks by gauging the mood of ordinary Party members on issues such as exporting the revolution abroad and launching more socialist economic policies aimed at transforming the USSR into a modern industrial state (Varga-Harris 4). Stalin’s predisposition to gauge the mood of common Russians made him hugely popular because he was viewed as a person who not only readily identified with the issues affecting common Party members, but also appeared keen to offer solutions that resonated well with the masses. While many Russian political figures such as Trotsky thrived on arrogance and defiance, Stalin found a way to appeal to common Party members who formed the bedrock of Socialist politics by gauging their mood and acting accordingly (Tucker 348-350). Although some scholars have argued that Stalin had several weaknesses (e.g., Georgian accent, lack of a strong voice due to health challenges, and short stature), he nevertheless perfected the techniques of self-promotion based on his attributes (e.g., astuteness, thoroughness, cynicism, complete absence of human attachment, immense charm, persuasiveness, and acute insights into the weaknesses of others) that served to endear him to the masses, legitimize his authority, and tame political opponents (Black 70; Strong and K...