An Opinion On Prohibiting Banks From Engaging In Proprietary Trading (Research Paper Sample)
The paper required the author to RESEARCH on the ban on bank's proprietary trading and provide an opinion.source..
What is your opinion on prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary trading? Discuss it with specific reference to your knowledge of banks.
Word Count; 2016
The author's opinion on prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary trading
The Volcker Rule is one of the most controversial sections of the Dodd-Frank Act. The rule, which came into effect in December 2013, seeks to prohibit banks from engaging in proprietary trading (Coffee, 2011). Proprietary trading, according to Boot and Ratnovski (2013), is speculative trading of financial instruments with the aim of profiteering on short-term price movements (Usually less than six months). Merkley and Levin (2011) also further adduce that even though speculative trading is a major function of banks, the Volcker Rule sought to limit the bank buying and selling in financial instruments in its capacity as a principal.
Proponents of the Rule cite a decreased systemic risk that is accustomed to reduced excessive risk-taking in banks (Lehmann, 2016; Bubb and Kahan, 2017; Omaroya, 2010; Elliot and Rauch, 2014). Further, they argue that banning proprietary trading would lead to a culture change leaning towards conservative banking that is risk-averse and more customer oriented. That notwithstanding, the Rule is not without its critics. Scholars have raised concerns about the cost and effectiveness of the ban warning that the rule may adversely affect the market liquidity, increase the cost of transactions, negatively impact the value of securities and render borrowing expensive in the future (Brunnermier and Pedersen, 2008; Morgan, 2002; Wilmarth Jr, 2010; Whitehead, 2011). This paper thus seeks to analyze the perceived benefits pros and cons of banning proprietary banking. The paper will also explore the role of banks in an economy and conclude with the author's opinion on whether proprietary banking should be prohibited or not.
Role of banks
Wilmarth (2012) defines a bank as an insured and licensed depository institution. Banks play a crucial role in the economy. One of the key functions of the bank is receiving funds from savers and allocating the same to borrowers efficiently and at a profit which is the difference between the interest charged and the interests earned (Rehlon and Nixon, 2013). In so doing, banks act as intermediaries between surplus and deficit economic agents. Another core function of banks is trading (Kroszner, 2000). Here, banks may trade financial instruments such as stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities, equities and other derivatives as financial intermediaries for their customers and sometimes in their capacity as a principal hence the term proprietary trading (Boot and Ratnovski, 2013). Trading involves speculative buying and selling of financial instruments for a profit. Other services offered by banks include risk management services, remittance of money, provision of liquidity to households and firms and promotion on entrepreneurship.
Banks should be prohibited from engaging in proprietary trading
This section of the paper explores the rationale for validating the prohibition of banks from engaging in proprietary trading. Generally, according to Lehmann (2016); Bubb and Kahan (2017); Omaroya (2010); Elliot and Rauch (2014), banning proprietary trading seeks to address five primary concerns being the creation of a safer banking system, cutting banks manageable and less risky sizes, reducing banks risk of default, promoting transparency and reducing the risk of fraud perpetration, and finally instituting a cultural change fostering risk averseness.
To begin with, analysts believe that prohibiting banks from engaging in proprietary trading would make stand-alone organizations and the overall banking system secure. According to Manasfi (2012), the ban would safeguard banks from market risks and earnings instability hence reducing the risk of systemic failure emanating from regular shocks and contagion. Further, according to Kress (2011), systemic risk, a postulation of counterparty risk, occurs when chains of counterparties form to enter complementary transactions. It follows that the failure by a single large counterparty to honor its obligations may trigger a domino effect affecting the whole system (Bubb and Kahan 2017; Omaroya, 2010).
Second, the prohibition would also reduce the size of banks making them less risky with regards to systemic risk. Lehman (2016) articulates the compulsion of the Federal Government to bail out AIG up to $85 billion using taxpayers' money during the 2008 financial crisis to avert a global financial meltdown as a result of the institution's liquidity crunch and inability to pay off its dues (Aragon and Stahan, 2012). The crisis of unwarranted risk-taking by banks through proprietary trading is also aggravated by the moral hazard that emanates from prescribed and informal government assurance. Riding under the banner of ‘too big to fail', entities undertake risky ventures with the assurance that the taxpayers will bear much of the costs should it fail (Wilmarth, 2012).
Third, barring banks from private equity and hedge fund operations straightforwardly solves a primary avenue of bank default risk. According to Ben-David, banks control up to 14 percent of Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and are the most active market players acting both as protection buyers and sellers. Accordantly, according to a 2009 survey, five banks, that is, JP Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Bank of America bore 96 percent of the CDS industry credit derivative risk exposure. Further, Kress (2011) asserts that one primary cause of bank failures during the recently ended financial crisis was involvement in equity trading and venture capital activities which shored up the risk of default. Thus prohibiting proprietary trading would reduce risk exposure hence stability.
Next, as in the case of the USA, another concern for establishing the Volcker rule was the need for increased transparency and lower risk of fraud. Kroszner (2000) asserts that proprietary trading by banks generates a conflict of interest vis-à-vis their customers' plight. For instance, banks would profiteer from waging against financial instruments that they had themselves created and later sold to their customers. To deter this, the rule set out to enumerate compliance provisions prompting banks to list securities and the rationale for investing in them alongside documentation of compensation schemes for dealers not linked to revenues from proprietary arrangements (Quirk, 2013).
Lastly, it is imperative to end proprietary trading by banks to promote the conservative risk management culture of banks. Lehman (2016); Manasfi (2012) argue that in the absence of proprietary activities, banks would shift back to the...
- Learning From the USADescription: This paper considers the use of value capture as a means of financing public-private partnerships in the United Kingdom...24 pages/≈6600 words| Other | Accounting, Finance, SPSS | Research Paper |
- An Opinion On Prohibiting Banks From Engaging In Proprietary TradingDescription: This paper thus seeks to analyze the perceived benefits pros and cons of banning proprietary banking. The paper will also explore the role of banks in an economy and conclude with the author's opinion on whether proprietary banking should be prohibited or not....7 pages/≈1925 words| 22 Sources | Other | Accounting, Finance, SPSS | Research Paper |
- Audit and Control of Information TechnologyDescription: Information Technology is a computer application program used to store, recover, convey and manipulate data of an organization or a business enterprise...8 pages/≈2200 words| Other | Accounting, Finance, SPSS | Research Paper |