Multi-Family Fire Scenario (Coursework Sample)

Multi-Family Dwelling Scenario
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Multifamily Dwelling Scenario
At around 0341 hours on August 14, 2018, the Boise (ID) Fire Department responded to a reported fire incident in a multiple-family dwelling located at the corner of Curtis along Overland Roads. The caller stated, "There were flames everywhere"; before disconnecting, the caller said, "it just blew up." Upon receiving the following information from the communication center, the chief in charge from the subsequent battalion had ordered a second alarm at around 0345 hours; this brought about five engines, two battalion chiefs, two trucks, several command staff, and several command staff and an incident safety officer.
On arrival at the scene, the building was a three-story, wood-frame, multiple-family dwelling approximately 70 feet wide and 230 feet long, comprising 24 flats, eight on every floor. The building constructed using traditional wood framing members had no lightweight manufactured wood members (Östman, 2017). There were four apartments at each end of the building (two on every floor). A set of four apartments, set back-to-back wall, was located in between the end apartments. A mutual attic region extended from end to end over the breezeways and apartment. The fire building was one of eight in the apartment complex. A physical pull station connected in the building, and the nearest exposure was 25 feet away.
The leading engine company to arrive at the fire scene had reported 25 percent engagement, with thick fire showing at the C-section of the building. The company officer then sent a command to Battalion 2. It was noticed that the fire involvement had been concentrated in the breezeway region between the apartments in the northeast corner (this had obstructed the main outlet of numerous inhabitants). According to the post-fire analysis, there was some old furniture and debris in the breezeway, the latter, which created a significant fire load. According to the investigation, the fire first took place in the breezeway, later extended to the apartment's first floor, second, and third floors.
The first engine company to arrive at the scene did stretch a two-and-a-half-inch line to the breezeway region to safeguard the way out; the second two-and-a-half-inch line was positioned into service to assist the first line in the C side breezeway. The leading due Truck Company then instigated a primary search in the fire region due to access problems; the truck had performed a vent-entre-search on the first-floor flats on the C-section. The third engine, then deployed in the B-side of the structure, reported that there had been fire showing from the entrance with no draft stopping in the lobby. The second track (from the second alarm) assisted in primary searches and evacuation from the apartment.
Two tenants rescued from the apartment had mild injuries; the casualties then taken to safety as there was a fast response to their health situation by the county ambulance on standby. Additionally, the command requested that the police department shut down traffic in the region at around 0351 hours. There was also a clear report for all the exposed apartments within the fire apartment; however, this never included the two apartments located on the C-section of the structure due to heavy fire involvement. Finally, at 0405 hours, the third battalion reported commanding that the fire was coming out through the roof and suggested using an elevated master stream. Thirty minutes into the fire, management requested the third alarm; this fetched two more engines, the remaining command staff, and a battalion chief.
Lines had been in the position for exposure protection; later on, the elevated master stream started operating from the structure’s A/D corner. Several large hand lines were also put to use on the C-section of the system. Later on, a command communicated those operations on the C-section of the structure would have been defensive, information that had confused those working on the B-section of the building. At 0455 hours, the command made a report on fire control, units then allocated to initiate salvage operations and secondary searches, recording a clear on all secondary searches at 0545 hours. Finally, together with the Red Cross team, the command relocated all affected by the fire.
In the following scenario, a hostile attack plan is used to protect the exit points. Vent-Entre-Searches did enable the firefighters to minimize the number of fire fatalities and damages brought about by fire. Due to limited staffing, a request was made for additional units to support the calculated plan. The second battalion then invited the subsequent alarm early enough, a move that helped them put the strategy into action (Cohen-Hatton, Butler, & Honey, 2015). Being the concerned officers had a practical indulgence of their boundaries for the preliminary operations. How important it was to commence the necessary plans enabled the chief to quickly construct the strategy instead of beginning it over.
Fire control principles used
Whenever planning and executing direct fires, the subordinate leaders and commanders must identify how to implement the many fundamental principles. The main aim of the fire principles is to limit the