Children's Autonomy in Decision-Making (Essay Sample)

Family Law: Children’s Autonomy in Decision-Making Student Name: Institutional Affiliation Course Instructor: Date: Family Law: Children’s Autonomy in Decision-Making Scientific developments in medicine are frequently cited as the distinguishing characteristics of the worldwide improvement of children's health and quality of life, making them key considerations in developing legal frameworks. Nonetheless, based on previous healthcare reports, some medical advancements carry sizable dangers and uncertainties that could compromise children’s wellness and interests. The choices encompassing healthcare can be particularly difficult for parents and children when assessed from scientific and legal perspectives. The Gillick case, in which it was decided that adolescents could consent to medical treatment if they had enough maturity and understanding to determine the question, is the key focus of this paper’s analysis. Despite the decisions made in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority and Another, 1986 F.L.R.1 224 (198) and R (Axon) v. Secretary of State for Health, 2006 E.W.H.C. 37 (2006) recognizing that children can make decisions upon getting to legal age, the courts are still reluctant to acknowledge the autonomy of a mature child. The concerns encompassing this reluctance could be attributed to protocols of maturity assessment, child protection, and legal standards that depict conflicting perspectives on what attributes qualify an individual as mature. The failure of courts to recognize the mature child's autonomy could be attributed to children’s ability to consent. In England, the legal age is 18, which implies that individuals are subject to certain privileges upon attaining this age. Nonetheless, legitimate vulnerabilities often characterize this group and require special protections under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (C.R.C.). However, the child's best interests necessitate considering their unique needs and developmental characteristics, as the Committee on Children's Rights has frequently emphasized. In the case of Re W (A Minor), one of the key considerations the court made under Section of the Family Law Reform was that a minor could refuse treatment. While this case encompassed a child transitioning to 16 years, it was challenging for the court to provide an otherwise interpretation of the F.L.R. as per the Section 8 provisions. This perspective aligns with the idea that children have unique features that distinguish them from other children (English & Ford, 2022). Therefore, when administering medical treatment to children, it is imperative to consider these attributes independently, as they can impact their ability to make decisions about their health. The consideration of children providing consent to treatment can be related to the findings of [Gillick]. According to Moscati (2022), the main issue following Gillick’s court ruling is a child or minor's right to make autonomous decisions. The broad age range that marks the start and end of legal childhood contains multiple interconnected developmental stages, each exposing kids to unique vulnerabilities. However, concerning [Axon], the law places a high priority on protecting children. In Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick Competency), the court noted that the child’s religious view, other than her age, was a critical area to consider in determining her capacity to make decisions. Such considerations undermine deliberations on the autonomy issue complex as there are multiple aspects to consider in allowing them to make critical decisions. Based on the court’s findings in [Re L], the complexities results in to mature child being afforded little to no genuine autonomy. Consequently, these perspectives reveal that the U.K. courts are reluctant to recognize the mature child because other factors also contribute to the decision-making process in healthcare. Besides the perspectives associated with age and other relevant factors, the competence tests are also key considerations in the court’s decisions about the mature child’s autonomy. One of these tests includes the Gillick competence test, an approach associated with English medical law. The method’s application involves determining whether an individual under 16 can consent to medical treatment without parental involvement. In Gillick vs. West Norfolk, the court opined that a child under 16 can agree to a medical examination and treatment [Gillick]. Their Lordships determined that a child under 16 could legally consent if they had the maturity and intelligence to comprehend the significance and nature of the suggested medical examination and treatment. Nonetheless, part of the judicial opinion suggested that this consideration was subject to discretion, implying that this consideration was only possible following the determination that all other relevant interests of the child’s wellness were met. For instance, in Re E (A minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), the court determined that the best decision about the child’s medical interests could only be met by balancing their interests and considering the medical decision from the child’s point of view. Based on this perspective, the court noted that besides the legal frameworks encompassing the child’s interests, their personal beliefs are also essential in determining their capacity to make autonomous decisions about their health. English courts have also ruled that when a minor decline a life-saving therapy or intervention, other parties retain the right to proceed despite the minor's objections. This perspective, therefore, reveals that courts are reluctant to recognize autonomy because they cannot rely only on legal frameworks to determine such decisions but also on some personal aspects related to the mature child. The court’s decision can also be assessed based on how the opinions of [Axon] invoked [Gillick]. In this case, Ms. Sue Axon, a divorced mother from Baguley, lost her legal battle in Wythenshawe, Manchester, where it was thought that her case would serve as a precedent for other parents who endure a similar situation. Ms. Axon opposed this by stating that the current rules giving teenagers confidential family planning assistance increased the possibility that they would engage in underage sex and ultimately have an abortion. Her main argument was that the House of Lords erred in interpreting [Gillick] and Wisbech Health Authority's decisions. The claimant noted that the consideration of what a child comprises should be addressed based on the perspectives of Article 8 of the ECHR. However, Ms. Axon implied that if the law was properly interpreted, a doctor was not obligated to keep the advice and treatment they plan to offer regarding contraception, S.T.D.s, and abortion confidential. As a result, the doctor must not give such advice and therapy to children without their parent's knowledge (Wheeler, 2022). Twenty years later, a court rejected the argument that it was in the general welfare to violate the confidentiality of a competent child to let her parents know that she wanted to have an abortion. The court determined that maintaining the privacy of the intelligent child's information was in the public interest. Based on the inconsistencies of such judgments, the court is reluctant to determine the autonomy aspects as the determining attributes are not yet clear. Consequently, although an immediate overhaul of the welfare principle is not imperative, adopting a proportional strategy appears most fitting (Dimopoulos, 2022). If the outcome is dubious, it is uncertain whether this strategy will yield positive results. Nevertheless, employing Gillick’s and Axon’s suggested model would guarantee that the parents' rights and concerns are somewhat represented in upcoming chil...