Fictional Characters (Essay Sample)

Fictional Characters
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Introduction
Amie Thomasson built an anti-factual theory that tries to accommodate fictional characters as a way of resolving the main problem associated with fictional discourse. The main problem associated with fictional characters is the apparent inconsistencies that exists when looking at the subject of fiction (Kim & Sosa, 1999 p. 68). Philosophers have tried to address this problem by developing varied theories. Most of these theories viewpoint is that fictional characters are “odd inhabitants existing in another realm” However, Amie Thomasson’s account of fictional characters is that they have a place in the ontology just like cultural artifacts do (p. 64). In this paper I examines Amie Thomasson’s account of fictional characters. In addition I explores the distinction aspect portrayed in her methodology before finally putting her account to the test using a counterexample and considering on her behalf how she might respond to these based on her methodology.
Thomasson argues that fictional characters comes into existence through what she refers as “human intentionality”, and that just like artifacts, they can evolve or cease to exists (become objects of the past) (p. 63-64). is what creates fictional characters. Thomasson supports her theory by providing examples to help people view fictional characters in the same light they view cultural artifacts. Her first illustration is how fictional characters are created and says that “intelligent beings” bring them into existence (p. 63). However, she notes the difference with artifacts as unlike artifacts being nonphysical things such as (chairs, tables etc.). Another difference is that they depend on their creators to exist (p.60). In addition, they are created at a certain periods of time for certain purposes which is the same case with artifacts.
Another issue that I have noted that makes her theory distinct is the evidence available in her theory. This has been achieved with Thomasson’s theory referring to the different pretense theories developed by philosophers, and then pointing out the loopholes in those theories, with an aim of putting more weight to her theory. Thomasson states that with an aim of trying to solve the problem of inconsistency, philosophers have developed varied theories. One example she refers to is theory by Kendall Walton who has tried to address this problem by advancing on the pretense theory to accept the idea that all talks that relates to fictional names has some form of pretense.
Thomasson critics Walton’s theory by stating that all fictional discourse may not involve pretense. In general, she says that these realist theories are incapable of adequately accounting to the reality of nonexistence claims they raise about what fictional names refer. Secondly, objection has been raised to what the pretense theories refers to as ontologically profligate or implausible to accept the existence of fictional characters and what they refer to.
Thomasson Theory
Fiction has continually been a philosophical problem because like in most other problems in classic metaphysics, there are apparent inconsistencies associated with the contemporary ways people speak and think about the subject. For example, in Frankenstein’s monster, some people may argue that it was a creation of Dr. Frankenstein while others argue that it is Mary Shelley’s creation. Another example is the argument that Sherlock Holmes is a detective one hand, while on the other hand, he is a fictional character and therefore he cannot solve crimes. Emma Woodhouse is a fictional character that does not exist but in other contexts there are such fictional character as Emma while Emma’s pesky kid brother is a nonexistent character. This are examples of the inconsistences of fictional discourse that I think any credible theory should address comprehensively.
A need therefore arises for a fictional discourse that should help people understand fictional discourse in a way that the apparent inconsistencies such as mentioned in the examples above are not appearing. In building such a fictional discourse, the following research questions should be answered; does a non-inconsistent fictional discourse involve allowing the fictional characters to be ever referred with their fictional names? What sorts of things and in which context does these fictional characters referred to? I think that Amie’s theory captures these questions comprehensively by the justification she presents as I will discuss below.
Thomasson notes that involving pretense while trying to solve the problem of inconsistence involved in fictional discourse seems a promising approach. However, she notes that names of fictional characters are rigid designators that refers to one and the same individual in all possible worlds. According to me, a view of fictional names that accepts that fictional names do at least sometimes refer to fictional characters is the best view. This I think is what is distinctive about her methodology because that is the viewpoint her theory takes.
A common desire to accept a pure pretense view over such a view is based on the concern that positing fictional characters is profligate or too implausible. According to Thomasson, people who accept the existence of literary work, but deny existence of fictional characters, distort the ordinary rules for usage of the term “fictional character” and fail to yield a genuinely more parsimonious ontology. In this context philosophers should take into account the ontological qualms that drive people to deny the existence of fictional characters or what fictional names refer to (Kim & Sosa, 1999 p. 74).
Another reason that I think makes Thomason theory distinct is has portrayed with clarity why it is not at all implausible to accept the existence of fictional characters. This is explained using some explicit examples of logical and the contemporary view of things. The best view of fictional characters is to view them as abstract cultural artifacts, suitably similar to other cultural and social entities including particular state laws (such as the Miranda Laws), musical works (such as Nielsen’s Symphony, called “the inextinguishable”), and literature works where fictional characters are featured. Works of literary and their association regarding the existence of fictional characters is especially of much interest. A suitable approach to fictional discourse would accept fictional characters without doing away with the non-contradiction principle or the law of the excluded middle.
Fictional characters should be viewed in artifactual views because such a view allows extraction of the identity conditions for fictional characters. This conditions are as good as those that exists for cultural objects, including in literature works. Accepting that fictional characters is no more implausible than accepting literature works or other abstract cultural artifacts such as laws, symphonies and marriages.
The other objection relates to the argument that positing fictional characters is ontologically profligate and therefore should be avoided if possible. The idea of parsimony and profligacy (a converse of parsimony). Comes into the picture while addressing this issue. A parsimonious theory is not gained by the denial of a given kind of entities if one accepts ordinary usage view that logically accept the existence of those entities. For example, the phrase “pair of gloves”, would logically refers to the existence of a left glove and a right glove. Using this example, it would be hard to interpret a case where a person is accepting the existence of a left glove and right a glove, and their match, while on the other hand denying the existence of there being a pair of gloves. Such a view violate the ordinary rule when using the word “pair.”
The same approach is relevant when using our cultural artifacts. For there to be a marriage, it is logically sufficient that there be certain accepted laws that lays out sufficient conditions for a legal marriage to occur (e.g. signing of a marriage license in the presence of an magistrate and witnesses), and the fulfillment of those conditions. In such as case, it would be difficult to understand what a person means by accepting the existence of such laws, events, and people but denying the existence of a marriages. Perhaps such a person might be having an artificially inflated idea of the meaning of a ‘real’ marriage.
Thomasson’s theory brings the perspective of looking at the existence of fictional characters by giving multiple examples of how people view cultural artifacts. She says that the...