Supreme Court of the United States: Hutchinson V. Proxmire (Essay Sample)

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Supreme Court of the United States: Hutchinson V. Proxmire
Identified by the number No. 78-680, Hutchinson Vs Proxmire is a Supreme Court case in which a research director sued a US senator against defamation (apa.org). In this case, the petitioner Ronald Hutchinson sued Senator William Proxmire for issuing a public statement that had defamatory allegations concerning the earlier’s research. The case required the Supreme Court to either confirm or reverse the district and the Court of appeal’s decision to grant a summary judgment. Proxmire had tabled the subject statement on the floor of the house and had also released it to the press. He also emailed the said statement to about 100, 000 of his constituents. Further, the defendant’s assistant had called the petitioner personally and reproached him on the same matter. In this case, Hutchinson sued for liberal, claiming that the senator’s publication caused him a financial loss and also defamed his integrity. The following is a breakdown of the case facts, arguments, and decisions.
The petitioner, a behavioral scientist, had received some funding for his research from the senator’s fund kitty program named the "Golden Fleece Award of the Month." Hutchison used the awarded funds to extend studies one of emotional behavior. His study examined the behavior patterns of animals, particularly monkeys’ response to stimuli. In the subject report, the senator claimed that such studies were a waste of tax payer’s money, claiming that Hutchinson sourced public funds for own and his monkey’s benefit. The senator’s statement was based upon the inquiries made on his behalf by his assistant who was allegedly following up on the public funds spending.
Feeling aggrieved by the senator’s conduct, Hutchison filed a suit against him in the US District Court of Wisconsin on April, 1976. He accused the senator of two counts; firstly, he alleged that the Proxmire's conduct had caused him humiliation, mental and anguishes as well as significant financial loss. He also argued that Proxmire made him a public scorn, thus ruining his ability to earn income in the future. In the second count, Hutchison alleged that the senator had interfered with his contractual terms with his finances. On this count, the petitioner reasoned that he had not obtained his funds directly from the senator, but rather from various institutions that were granted the kitty direct from the senator. He later added to the complaint that the senator’s conduct infringed his privacy rights by distorting his peace and serenity.
On his defense, the respondent argued that he and his assistant were protected by the Speech and Debate clause. They also claimed protection under the Free Speech Clause of the 1st Amendment against that acknowledges the critiques over public spending. Further, the defendants, argued that the petitioner was both a public figure and a public official. For this reason, they requested the court to observe the ‘actual malice standard as in the New York Co. v., Sullivan. However, the petitioner contended that his case would require proving of actual malice.
In its decision, the district court had found that both Proxmire and his assistant were immunized under the Speech and Debate Clause. In addition, the court held that the defendant was discharging his duties of informing the public through press releases. Further, argued that Proxmire’s press releases would be no different from the media’s coverage of his report as tabled on the floor of the Senate. On the question whether the petitioner was a public figure, the court held that the petitioner was not a public figure. Even if he was a public figure, the court held that the proof of malice did not meet the New York Times Co.’s threshold. For these reasons, the District Court granted a summary judgment for the senator and his assistant.
Not satisfied with the court’s decision, the petitioner filed an appeal with the Seventh Circuit Court. However, the court of appeal confirmed the District Court’s decision and restated that the two enjoyed immunity Speech and Debate Clause. However the appeal court specified that the immunity was restricted to press and constituent releases, but not to media broadcast and telephone communications as made by the senator’s assistant. It contrasts the district figure on whether the petitioner was a public figure. Contrastingly, the appeal court found that the petitioner was a public figure since he had published numerous scholarly publications and had been the subject of several media houses.
The matters of contention before the Supreme Court included the decision on whether the defendant’s conduct was immune under the Speech and Debate Act and whether the Petitioner was a public figure. Suppose the petitioner was a public figure, is there a proof of intent of malice? On its decision, the Supreme Court the reversed the District and the appeals court's award of summary judgment and remanded the matter for more proceedings. According to the Supreme Court, the senator enjoyed immunity on the statements tabled in the Senate only. The Speech and Debate Clause does not shield any information given via press release or telephone interviews. In addition, the court emphasized that the said clause does not protect the senator over the defamatory remarks made. Further, the Supreme Court did not acknowledge the petitioner as a public figure. Thus, the question of actual malice does not suffice.
Upon a critical analysis, the author of this paper agrees in part with the court’s decision. Firstly, Proxmire and his assistant’s conduct fall outside the protection of the Speech and Debate Clause. Although the reports clause offers immunity to speeches and reports tabled on the floor of the house, it does not offer protection against telephon...