J.S. Mill on Hate Speech and Free Expression (Essay Sample)

Student’s Name Instructor Course Title Date J.S. Mill on Hate Speech and Free Expression Introduction In his legal brief, Chief Justice Dickson upholds the permissibility of forbidding hate speech on the grounds that doing so promotes values “central to freedom of expression.” The specific wording is important here. Dickson argues not for “forbidding” hate speech per se, but rather “rejecting” it, a rather vague sentiment which is open to wide interpretation. Regardless of whether the state agrees to repress hate speech or merely “reject” it, it is unlikely that famed utilitarian thinker and classical liberal J.S. Mill would have much sympathy for either position. Mill would, this paper argues, insist that an agent of the state, which Dickson is, has no right to designate what speech exists outside the bounds of acceptable discourse since to do so would be to presume an infallibility which no individual or group can ever have. No argument can ever be dismissed a priori. If there is an incorrect assertion or belief, it must be allowed to be aired. Mill advocates for free speech absolutism. Speech can never be suppressed since the would-be suppressor is never qualified to make the assertion that speech in a particular instance must not be permitted. This paper will first outline Dickson’s position and how Dickson might respond to Mill. Mill’s position vis a vis free speech and Dickson’s rejection of hate speech will then be presented as a rebuttal. Finally, a verdict will be rendered as to who has the stronger argument. Free Speech for Dickson Dickson concedes that suppressing hate speech and free speech absolutism are incompatible. That is, for those who promote hate speech, to be muzzled by the state is an infringement on their democratic freedoms (R vs. Kreegstra 4). In other words, an individual who wishes to exercise their right to speak however they like is being denied this right, and this is a violation of the democratic principle. The wording is important here. It is the “democratic” process which is being infringed upon here, not the right of self-expression which is held by each sovereign individual per se. The democratic process ensures free speech in order for good ideas to be heard and bad ideas to be rejected, with all citizens being free to choose from among them. In other words, bad ideas are weeded out through a process of trial and error, and that process takes place at the scale of the democratic system itself. Mill would likely concede agree to this point, as he argues that this process is central to understanding many times over the course of his discourse “Thought and Discussion” (Hylton 36). Dickson does not believe that this infringement is significant, however. In a democracy, the greater threat is to those who, because they belong to an “identified group,” are targets for suppression by hate speech promulgators. The will of people belonging to these groups is imperiled by hate speech propaganda on the basis of their race or religion. These individuals are rejected, intimidated or defamed based on immutable characteristics and not the strength or weakness of their ideas. The strength of the arguments put forward by proponents of hate speech need not be aired in order to be evaluated. Ideas based around hate towards a particular identified group does not facilitate democratic values, those values including “the quest for truth,” “individual self-development" and other values central to democracy (R vs. Kreegstra 4). Dickson Responds to Mill Dickson would likely point out that when Mill is defending free speech, he does so for the sake of arriving at truth above all. Mill is concerned with ideas which may or may not be demonstrated true based on evidence (Bell 165). The reason that Mill wants to ensure that free speech is preserved is because he fears the tyranny of any individual or group who claims the prerogative of knowing truth from falsehood. Mill asks rhetorically where human understanding would be if Newton were successfully suppressed (Bell 166). He has in mind disagreements over truth claims, or else things which can are unknowable. That is, it is those things which can be investigated using evidence and rational deduction, like Newtonian physics, and those things which can never be known through examining evidence, like whether or not there is a god which are material here. The ideas that Mill is concerned with protecting concern things like, “...belief in a God and in a future state, or any of the commonly received doctrines of morality” (Hylton 37). Statements promoting the inherent maliciousness of a particular group, like Jewish people, is not what Mill had in mind. There is no evidence to turn over here. It is not a matter of either scientific inquiry or rational supposition. Promoters of hate propaganda are not putting forward a position speculatively so that it might be weighed and evaluated in the marketplace of ideas. On the contrary, hate propaganda is meant to stifle individual expression, which includes debate. Hate promoters do not wish to participate in the free exchange of ideas but instead wish to deny individuals “equal respect and dignity” which is sine qua non for the functioning of a healthy democratic process (R vs. Kreegstra 59). Dickson would argue that the Canadian government is not in the words of Mill robbing the society and posterity of new ideas by rejecting hate speech (Peonidis 30). There is little values in these words for their airing to be necessary and far greater utility in suppressing them (R vs. Kreegstra 4). Mill on Free Speech Moving on from Dickson’s arguments, it is material to explore Mill’s position on free speech and how he might respond to Dickson if he could. Mill would be skeptical of any agent of the state being an arbiter of the truth in any form. The idea that any judge could decide between truth and falsehood would be anathema to him. For Mill, the value of free speech does not lie in its utility (Hylton 42). The usefulness of a particular kind of speech, or lack thereof, is irrelevant concerning whether or not it should be allowed. If hate speech is useless, as Dickson would claim that it is, then so be it. This does nothing to suggest that its suppression is valid. Mill is suspicious of government agents looking to promote “beliefs indispensable for well-being" whatever these may be (Hylton 45). Whatever truths these agents, and even the public whose will they claim to represent, may say they are doing, they cannot claim to know the truth so absolutely that they can declare themselves qualified to say what it is not. Usefulness is no measure of the value of speech since any kind of speech can be considered useful to someone. Dickson’s interest in promoting “democratic values” would not sway Mill for this reason. Mill on Dickson It may be true that suppressing hate speech makes those belonging to identified groups more comfortable to speak. This in turn might make them feel empowered to participate in the democratic process. This is a desirable outcome, and therefore the suppression of hate speech may be useful in promoting that end. But usefulness cannot be the measure of whether speech should be allowed since it is too easy for those who wish to promote what is useful to flatter themselves into believing that they know what is true also (Peonidis 32). Mill understands that the truth itself is what is useful. But this does not mean that what is useful is true. Mill maintains radical skepticism regarding what is true. No individual or society can ever claim to hold truth, because anyone who does so assumes that they cannot be wrong. Dickson measures the value of free speech in relation to its promotion or negation of democratic values in part because democracy and speech are not interchangeable concepts. Free speech can exist even in societies with no guarantee of open elections, for instance. So, Dickson is defining one value, free speech, based on its utility in the promotion of another value, the democratic process. But free speech holds absolute value in itself for Mill. Dickson’s assertion that the infringement of free speech in the case of hate speech is permissible because it “contributes little... in the quest for truth” would likely strike Mill as hubristic (R vs. Kreegstra 4). Dickson cannot claim with certainty that hateful views can safely be dispensed with in the pursuit of truth, because to do so would be tantamount to claiming to know what truth is with unshakeable certainty (Bell 175). No one can say what truth is not without simultaneously making a claim about what truth is. Moreover, the fears that Dickson expresses about the free expression of individuals belonging to identified groups would not be convincing either. Justifying the suppression of speech using the argument tha...