Crash of FedEx Flight 1478 (Essay Sample)

Name Professor Course Date Crash of FedEx Flight 1478 The July 26, 2002, FedEx 1478 flight crash has many reasons surrounding its crash form the initial report prepared by the NTSB report. The cause of the crash was the captains and first officer failure to identify a proper glide path. The report suggested various contributing reasons which could be behind the tragic crash of the aircraft ranging from weather at the Tennessee airport, air traffic control issues, human factors, fatigue from the captain, poor training of the captain and cocktail deign of the aircraft. According to the cocktail voice recorder, about one minute from departure, the captain had received weather information that indicated that there were some strong winds of about 5 knots and visibility of 9 statute miles mainly due to the scattered clouds between 100 feet and 2500 feet. Due to this weather condition the captain and the first officer agreed to use runway 27. Two minutes later the captain and the flight officer decided to descend to flight level 240. The TLH ramp officer at the airport had instructed them to use gate 2 of the airport and park the aircraft facing south. Two minutes later the captain were instructed to maintain nine thousand as they descended. At 0616.38 (1 minute and 2 seconds ) after being cleared by the Jacksonville air traffic control, to descend at nine thousand, the captain of FedEx 1478 question the flight engineers about the weather conditions. However at this particular moment there were a series of confusing information form the flight engineer as briefed on runaway 27. The engineer advised the captain to maintain 3300 feet msl (mean sea level). 5 minute before the crash the Jacksonville ARTCCC cleared the aircraft to land at around 3000. The flight engineer also had indicated to the ground personnel who assured that ground power was available for the airplane. 4 minutes before the flight the captain and the flight officer acknowledged seeing the beacon, but they indicated that they did not see the runway. The flight engineer at Jacksonville ARTCC cleared the pilot and the flight engineer for the visual approach into the airport. The flight engineer in his post-accident report acknowledged that before landing he saw the airport about the same time the first officer had the runway in sight. This means that the weather conditions might contribute to the visibility of the runway from a distance. Among other factors attributed to the cause of the aircraft crash are the human factors. There were a series of confusion both from the flight engineer, the first officer and the air traffic controller and the Jacksonville base. The confusion arises from the runway information. Initially, the captain was advised not to use runway nine, however, they decided to land on it due to the information they got as they approached the runway. From their interpretation of the PAPI lights, they decided to land on runway nine though they had been advised not to land on them. The PAPI light lenses as the report suggests, were contaminated. There were condensed materials in the PAPI lights which evaporated as they were energized. Secondly there were issues of color visions from the captain and the first officer side. The captain and the first officer seemed not to have a clear vision of the runway from as they approached the filed. This means that they might have misinterpreted the information and resulted to poor landing and eventual crash of the aircraft. The first officer in his report said that as they neared the filed, the wind was still prevailing in the runway. He asked the captain to land on runway nine since that is where the wind was. The officer also added that when he saw the PAPI lights they indicated white lights next to the red ones. This meant that the aircraft was on the glide path. This was the reason that the captain and the first used to land on runway nine. The flight engineer was also able to observe lights at the runway and other aircrafts which were nearing the runway. He was able to see pink lights, two red lights and the four light-PAPI system. Fatigue is another issue related to this flight. According to the report, the flight engineer, the captain and the first officer had poor sleep schedule 72 hours prior to the crash. For instance, the first officer had less than 15 hours on uninterrupted sleep during that period. Similarly, the flight engineer and the captain both had also less than 16 hours of uninterrupted sleep. This suggests that the three crew members might be tired during that period, and this could have contributed to their poor judgments and reaction during the flight. In addition, the captain had agreed not to have slept well the previous night since he was attending to the family dog which was in bad health. He had interrupted sleep during the night. He also indicated that he slept in the couch. The first officer had also complained about the changing schedules for his sleep due to the night and day routines. The first officer’s roommate also indicated that, before the flight, the first officer looked tired and preoccupied. On the training, the captain (aged 55 years) had completed over 13000 flight hours with 2754 flight hours as a 727 flight crew member. The captain had also an airline transport pilot certificate which he acquired in 1999. The captain had a wide experience in flight 727 having served in various capacities as a flight engineer, pilot in command and second in command. FedEx also added that, in addition to that, the captain had satisfied the company on his skills in fatigue management, crew resource management and visual approaches. The flight engineer had also the same certificate as the captain but and had flown 2600 flight hours with FedEx. The operation management of FEDEX Corporation can be partly linked to the crash of this aircraft. As the report indicate...