Pragmatic, Ethical and Moral Employments of Practical Reason (Other (Not Listed) Sample)

REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS
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Introduction
The book by Habermas, as translated by Ciaran Cronin, presents the most recent contribution to ethical theory, clarifying and expanding on discourse ethics. It comes in five chapters arranged in chronological order. The book commences with translator’s note and translators introductory note. Later on, it discuses topics such as “On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employment of Practical Reason, “Remarks on Discourse Ethics,” “Neo-Aristotelianism and Lawrence Kohlberg,” and “Reflection on a Remark of Max Horkheimer.” Lastly, an interview with Torben Hviid Nielsen focusing on topics such as the genesis of discourse ethics, its controversial elements, and interrelations with the communicative action theory concludes the book. Habermas defends the claim of discourse to a central positioning contemporary moral philosophy.
Pragmatic, Ethical and Moral Employments of Practical Reason
The first chapter provides a comprehensive examination of practical rationality that establishes a clear difference between ethical, pragmatic and moral questions. The section also distinguishes between spheres of practical discourses and forms of volition. Habermas elaborates and refines fundamental concepts of his approach and extends his argument in aspects such as treatment of rational reason and the challenges of motivation and application. He provides an excellent critique of competing positions such as those of Charles Taylor, Albrecht Wellmer, Bernard Williams and John Rawls. He also establishes the wide-ranging defense of discourse ethics.
The book attempts to expound on the implication of communicative rationality in the scope of normative validity and moral understanding. It is a composite theoretical effort to reorganize the valuable ideas of Kantian deontological beliefs regarding the assessment of communicative structures. Hence, the book attempts to elaborate on the universal and essential nature of morality by conjuring the global responsibility of “communicative rationality.” Habermas believes that justifying the validity of moral standards can be effected in a way comparable to the rationalization of facts. The whole project uses the reasonable construction of moral intuition. In his work, Habermas goal is to find a middle ground between the relativistic implications of contextualizes and communitarian position of Hegel and Aristotle and abstract universalism. He undertakes an elaborate defense of discourses of ethics against its skeptics from the neo-Aristotelian camp.
After identifying different types of discourse, Habermas goes ahead and explain how the two interrelate. From the book, it is clear that several discussions depend on each other. The most obvious one is ethical and moral discourses that somewhat rely on empirical claims hence depending on the result of practical discourses regarding situations and the consequences of behavioral laws and the shared pursuit of decent life. Habermas rejects the notion of a meta-discourse that sorts out the boundary matters.
On addressing the theory of communicative actions, Habermas believes that it lies on the idea that social order is contingent upon the ability of the players to identify and understand the inter-subjective soundness of varying assertions on which social collaboration relies. Consequently, Habermas elaborates the cognitive and rational character used to conceive the cooperation in regards to efficacy claims. He argues that to identify the validity of claims is to imagine that worthy reason can be justified in case of criticism. Habermas refers the theory of discourse or argumentation as the reflective communicative deed.
Furthermore, Habermas suggests a multi-variant conception of reason that depicts itself in varying form of “cognitive validity” both in actuality and rightness claims relating to the treatment we owe others, technical-practical claims concerning the means of achieving our goals and factual allegations relating to good life amongst others. Habermas recognizes that the “surface grammar of speech acts” does not suit to found this collection of validity. Therefore, he proposes that we must supplement semantic analysis with practice analysis of varying argumentative discourse to ground the multi-dimensional validity claims.
But the model involved in learning different traditions is open to several objections including; that it is too selective. The recognition of the rational superiority of alien culture may sufficiently motivate one’s tradition if the learning subject can compare the explanatory power. However, in the book, MacIntyre posits that, if leaning from foreign culture is feasible, the two traditions must be able to communicate with each other without assuming universal standards of rationality. Maclntyre experiences essential inaccessibility which he delivers to readers in a third language. However, Maclntyre posits that the fact that the knowledge of untranslatability is expressible should raise concerns.
In the book, Habermas quotes Guenther Patzig and states that moral judgment differs from ethical decision only in their degree of contextually. Deontological ethical theories assume that moral issues arise in circles of subjects capable of action and speech because we depend on consensus and cooperation of others. We direct our moral judgments and feeling to animals which aren’t capable of speech. Conversely, animals cannot enter into reciprocity relationship with a human being. Patzig agrees that humans have duties towards animals but animals do not have obligations towards people hence humans need to protect animals
The various contentious discussions should be inter-subjectively justified. Regardless if Habermas theory of meaning thrives or not, the discursive scrutiny of validity shows the vital variances in arguments requires that we come with varying forms of legitimate claims. Habermas argues that such kind of validity is separate from other ways, only if someone can prove that its “discursive justification” includes characteristics that separate it from different types of explanations. Hence, the discourse theory by Habermas assumes that the cognitive topic of argumentation defines the particular argumentative practice suitable for such validation. Thus, the “discourse theory” requires logical analysis of arguments as a social practice. Habermas presumes that one cannot comprehensively articulate normative presupposition solely on valid properties of arguments. Somewhat, he/she must distinguish argument as a procedure, a product and as a process. It is evident that Habermas regards these perspectives as constituting the practical idea of cogency.
Lawrence Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianism
The book also focuses on Lawrence Kohlberg theory of moral development based on his believes that person advance in their ethical thinking through a sequence of six identifiable stages: punishment and obedience, individualism, instrumentalism and exchange, good, social contract and principled conscience. In the initial stage, individuals behave according to socially tolerable norms. The second level is readily available in the society while the majority does not reach the third level. Stage five is a comprehension of social mutuality, and stage six bases on respect for global principle and demands of personal conscience. The book summarizes the objections against moral theories of the Kantian type as follows: they make an abstract differentiation between good and right unavoidable leading to abstraction from motivations. More so, the cognitivist privileging raises critical questions of the application of norms while the formalist leads to abstraction from ethical life that assumes concrete forms within a particular type of life.
Following articles by Tulum, Habermas considers most argumentations as final resting on implicative discussions whose findings don’t follow deductive certainty but less plausible. The logical power of such kinds of arguments relies on consideration of all possible objections and information. However, critical testing of competing cases relies on the rhetorical value of the convincing process. Habermas considers the rhetorical levels regarding the highly idealized property of communication; presented as “ideal speech situation” he suggests that a perfect situation should have real discourses measuring up to motifs that he employs.
Discourse Ethics
Habermas defines the notion of adequate rhetorical process as a combination of indispensable yet practical presuppositions that persons should make if they have to consider the real implementation of dialectical procedures as a sufficient fundamental test. He goes further and identifies the four presuppositions namely: participants have an equal voice, no exclusion of anyone who can make relevant contributions, honest of opinion free from self-deception and deceit and finally, no coercion in the procedures of discourse. These conditions are counterfactual since actual conversations can never achieve noncoercion, full inclusion, and equality. Hence, Habermas advocates for measuring all relevant arguments reasonably, weighing discussion on merit and the pursuit of truth.
As an understanding of the periphrastic viewpoint, Habermas formal model does not do fairness to the central abundance of the rhetorical practice. However, he argues that a person can complement his/her design with Aristotle’s “substantive rhetoric” that bases on pathos and ethos. The book discusses that A rhetorical perspective deals with crafting discourses for their capability to place the audience in proper social-psychological space for making an accountable judgment.
On differentiation of argumentative disco...