Wertheimer and Goodin: A Comparative Analysis (Other (Not Listed) Sample)

EXPLOITATION: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WERTHEIMER AND GOODIN First and Last Name Course Name Due Date Wertheimer and Goodin: A Comparative Analysis In comparing the work of exploitation theorists Robert Goodin and Alan Wertheimer, it is worth understanding their divergent ideas about the definitions of exploitation. Both thinkers have convergent opinions about many of the aspects of exploitation, and these will be explored first. But while each share many opinions about what does and does not constitute exploitation, there are flaws in Goodin’s definition of exploitation which are significant enough that Wertheimer’s argument can be considered the superior of the two. This essay is concerned with proving this point. Both Wertheimer and Goodin agree in certain respects about the nature of what constitutes exploitation. Both see for exploitation to be wrong there has to be a degree of unfairness. Exploitation does not always exist in unfair circumstances, however. People can mistreat one other and still not exploit one other. Crucially, exploitation requires that one party gain at the expense of another. But while there are many points of agreement, there are also important disagreements. Goodin defines exploitation as the taking advantage of unusual circumstances or, alternatively, the unusual use of ordinary circumstances. Wertheimer makes no such demand on a circumstance for it to be considered exploitative. This is to Wertheimer’s credit, since Goodin’s definition of exploitation contains within it a serious flaw.[Robert E. Goodwin, Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person (SAGE Publications, 1987), 130.] [Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation, (Princeton University Press, 1999), 6.] [Robert E. Goodwin, Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person (SAGE Publications, 1987), 126.] [Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation, (Princeton University Press, 1999), 17-18.] [Goodin, Exploiting a Situation, Exploiting a Person, 129.] Goodin assumes that what is paradigmatic and usual is what is morally good. That is, because someone who takes advantage of an unusual circumstance is deviating from the norm, Goodin is assuming that the norm itself must reliably be good. One example which demonstrates this point is the hypothetical situation Goodin outlines. If someone were to buy an unproductive farm in order to have a loss which can be written off in taxes, then this person is using the tax law which was meant to provide relief to farmers unusually. This would be exploitative because this person is using the tax law in an unusual way. “Usual” in this case can be understood as the way the law is intended, regardless of how many people are taking advantage of this tax law. This deviates from the standard definition of usual, which is something common. Goodin’s redefinition of the word “usual” does not take into account all of the ways that unfairness might be institutionalized and become paradigmatic.[Robert E. Goodwin, Exploiting a Situation and Exploiting a Person (SAGE Publications, 1987), 128.] Consider the following case. Suppose there is a fictional country in which there is endemic corruption. All institutions are parasitic in this country because wages are low and supplementing one’s income with bribes is the way that every public official from the president to ordinary civil servants survive. A civil servant is appointed to the job of issuing marriage licenses. This civil servant’s predecessor demanded bribes to issue marriage licenses, and so the incoming servant continues this practice. The new official demands a bribe at the same rate set by the old official. Each couple who requests a license is told they must pay this bribe. The rate is the same for each couple. Anyone who refuses to pay the bribe is refused the license. The bribe money goes straight into the pocket of the official and does not enter the state fund. That is, no portion of the bribe might benefit the citizenry in any way. According to Goodin’s definition, there is no exploitation taking place here. When the civil servant demands the bribe, this action is paradigmatic. The civil servant is not taking advantage of any unusual circumstance. The request for a marriage license is not unusual. Many people will request a marriage at some point in their lives, and the office fulfills requests every day. Some couple who is unaware that this transaction is paradigmatic and ordinary might object that this is unfair. But the civil servant can point out that every couple who applies must pay a bribe of exactly the same price. No person can claim to have an unfair advantage over any other, and therefore the transaction is fair. For Wertheimer, it is not adequate to consider whether a situation is paradigmatic and usual for the definition of exploitation to be met. Instead, the comparative benefit of both parties in a given transaction have to be considered. The official is issuing licenses which holds no value for them and exchanging it for the bribe, which has value to both parties. There is some benefit to both parties, so this is a case of “mutually advantageous exploitation”. But the official has the obvious advantage. A single couple can refuse to the arrangement, but there will always be couples will pay. The official can withhold the license at will and the couple has no recourse. By using their power to their advantage, the official is exploiting the public according to Wertheimer’s definition but not Goodin’s. To claim the above transaction is not exploitative would be ludicrous. Wertheimer’s definition is therefore the stronger of the two.[Wertheimer, Exploitation, 14.] Besides not relying on whether or not a situation is paradigmatic or not, Wertheimer’s definition is superior to Goodin’s in at least one other respect. As Wertheimer points out, Goodin’s definition is both rigid and vague. Goodin believes that to take advantage of a person is never morally permissible and that the degree of exploitation has no bearing on the fact that it is immoral. But as Wertheimer says, “...offers too little...” It may be true that any degree of exploitation is wrong, but this alone does not help to understand the various ways that exploitation can occur. For Wertheimer, there are number of possible situations in which exploitation can occur and the relative benefit of the two parties involved is important. Exploitation can occur in situations in which A takes advantage of B. But the degree to which B gains from the transaction is significant. Exploitation is not standardized for Wertheimer. It cannot be assumed to have occurred because unfairness is present.[Wertheimer, Exploitation, 13.] Goodin is a proponent of the welfare state, not because it will eliminate exploitation entirely but because it can protect the most vulnerable members of society from being exploited. But Goodin assumes that the most vulnerable to exploitation can be known. Actually, it is not clear who in a welfare state is the exploiter and who is the exploited, if anyone. Goodin must assume that at baseline the welfare state is fair in principle. That is, it is not exploitative for taxes to be collected by the citizenry and for these proceeds to be redistributed to those who might otherwise be exploited by other more powerful actions into exploitative situations. The welfare state becomes paradigmatic. Those who use it in the usual way, that is the way that it was intended to be used, are presumably free of the charge of exploitation. If it were exploitative for someone to apply for welfare when they did not have other means to support themselves, then Goodin would not support such a condition. That Goodin favors the welfare state as a way of protecting against exploitation suggests that he does not consider the welfare state to be inherently exploitative. It is worth considering whether this is true.[Goodin, Exploiting People, Exploiting Things, 124.] Let it be assumed that there is a business owner. Some portion of this person’s personal wealth is taxed and those taxes are then put in a pool that can be accessed by those who apply for welfare. A welfare recipient applies for the program and receives aid in the form of cash. This cash allows the recipient a stable income. The business owner is in need of more workers and so advertises that a position is available. Because the welfare recipient has the security to accept employment or to reject an offer, they consider the owner’s offer. If the welfare recipient agrees to work for the business owner, they will earn more income than the welfare affords them. But the welfare recipient declines the offer, valuing their free time more than the difference in income the job would offer over welfare. The welfare recipient has been saved from exploitation, as Goodin intended. The question is whether the business owner has been exploited in this situation. The owner pays taxes which the welfare recipient is exempt from. The owner has no opportunity to opt out of this arrangement. The taxes are deducted regardless of what the owner wants. The fact that the owner does not consent to have the taxes withheld is not relevant to the question of exploitation, according to Goodin. Consent is immaterial because exploitation can take place even in situations where an individual has given consent. Therefore, the fact that consent is not present is no proof one way or the other regarding exploitation. The welfare recipient has the agency to apply for payment or not, and to accept employment instead of a welfare payment or not. The owner has no such choice. Then it might be said that the owner is being coerced. Even if true, this argument would not convince Goodin who rejects the idea that coercion is necessarily proof coercion.[Goodin, Exploiting People Exploiting Things, 141.] [Goodin, Exploiting People, Exploiting Things, 133.] Goodin’s definitions of exploitation are inadequate compared to Wer...