Douglas McArthur and Critical Thinking for Operation Chromite (Term Paper Sample)

Douglas McArthur and critical thinking for Operation Chromite
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Douglas McArthur and critical thinking for Operation Chromite
Background
According Elder and Paul, there exists two dimensional aspects that need to be mastered by any individual in making decisions. These dimensions need to identify the "parts of their thinking as well as be able to assess the use of these parts
A question recurrent to many individual is, "What accurate intellectual standards are the best fit to assess the ‘parts’ of their thinking?" These question also recurs even in many leaders (in this case McArthur) minds. There exists many standards of reasoning that can be effective in used in the correct contexts. In addition, some of these standards have even become virtually universal. They include; clarity, accuracy, precision, depth, relevance, breadth and logic which have applicable to thinking. How well a leader provides good reasoning, depend on how well they apply these universal standards to the parts (elements) of thinking.
What follows is a brief description of how General McArthur used these eight elements of reasoning to emerge victorious with his amphibious plan, Operation Chromite.
Discussion
Following a series of battles that led to failure during the Korean War, the United States of America attained its first victory against the North Koreans with the help of its eighth army which had executed a brilliant plan of landing at Inchon. Striking deep into the Korean rear and leapfrogging up its western coast, this operation disoriented the North Koreans advances causing the offensive campaign to collapse as the armies were forced into a headlong retreat. The Chinese intervention, later on, acted as the mediator and prevented the final destruction and defeat of the Korean government thus subsequently sustaining peace and ending the conflict.
This brief description identifies the purpose for reasoning as stated by Elder and Paul in their article, "Critical Thinking" The main objective of the U.S army had for many years been to conquer Inchon. This course remained fresh in the army’s minds and with the help of good reasoning skills by the general had finally yield its gift for patience and perseverance.
Analysis
The original architecture of this victory was General Douglas MacArthur, who at the age of 70 was the commander in chief, Far East Theater and was regarded as the veteran of both world wars. MacArthur, in his capacity, was responsible for crafting the ingenious plan that liberated North Korean invasion which had started on June 25, 1950. ." (MacArthur, 1964).
Considering the magnitude of the war, it was hard to decide on whether or not to intervene in the war. With this regard, and the knowledge of the consequences of the intervention, was MacArthur justified in his actions to speak and decide on solutions that would lead to solving the predicament ahead?
This question represents a basis for analysis. As a reader you are bound to figure out whether the general's intervention was really necessary. According to my analysis, I beg to agree with his actions. I am even convinced that these actions were heroic even though it led to his death afterwards. He displays the strength and courage required by any leader to motivate and sway his employees, in this case, the army.
The move by the General to intervene in order to provide a long-lasting solution to the predicament gives further credit Elder and Paul’s Article. They describe good reasoning techniques as capable of identifying a peril and offering a solution. MacArthur’s confidence to intervene the war illustrates that he was well aware of the awaiting dangers but was also prepared to counter and offer a lasting solution to the predicament they faced as a country.
The general stood at the bow of Mount McKinley, the ship that carried Task Force 90, facing towards the coast of South Korea and the darkness that waited ahead. It was at exactly 2:30 am on the 15th day of September. The general’s audacious amphibious invasion plan, Operation Chromite was scheduled to start at dawn in the port city of Inchon. (Wagamese, 2008).
The virtue of confidence which was a leading attribute of MacArthur saw that the planning of Chromite was successful in wresting and conceiving control over the Korean War, thus consequentially liberating South Korea from invasion by their northern counterparts. The plans and executions by the general, from my perspective, were complete and seemingly unshakable.
The plan was also intended for a good course and was therefore a justified one. A critical analysis on the causes and effects of the Chromite plan indicate that the general was cautious in his approach as he intended to win the battle with only a few men. He chose the best and the strongest to accompany him to the war that later transformed history.
Few hours just before dawn, the ship was tensed. The 40,000 soldiers aboard were bold, and the general felt the whole weight of leadership descend upon him. They all hoped that the other 100,000 men manning the defenses would not die. The general later said, "I alone was responsible for tomorrow, and if I failed, the terrible results would rest on judgment day against my soul." (MacArthur, 1964).
During the period when the war was little more than a week old, the general, MacArthur told his chief of staff, General [Edward M.] Almond, to begin arranging plans for an amphibious operation. This action was aimed to strike the enemy center of communications at Seoul city. It was also intended to study the location to carry out the plan.
By late July, the idea had started to take its shape. The general, in his planning stage, had made a layout and had pictured how the plan would be carried out. During the 23rd day of the month, the chief of staff under General MacArthur’s instructions circulated to the GHQ staff sections the outline of the deadly Operation CHROMITE. The operation called for an amphibious operation in September and stated three critical steps:
(1) Plan 100-B which entailed landing at Inchon on the west coast;
(2) Project 100-C which involved landing at Kunsan on the west coast;
(3) Plan 100-D, landing near Chumunjin-up on the eastern seaboard. Plan 100-B that called for a landing at Inchon with a simultaneous attack by the Eighth Army was preferable. This steps were based on geographical areas and knowledge in preparation. Here, the knowledge is able to manifest his accuracy in preparations. This is in accordance with Elder and Paul’s view that the reasoning should be created from an assumption point of view.
On August 12, MacArthur issued CINCFE Operation Plan 100-B and specifically named the Inchon-Seoul area as the target that an unusual invasion force would seize by amphibious assault. MacArthur began planning and preparation with a scheduled cell located in his GHQ staff; forces earmarked for the operation were to be placed in GHQ Reserve as they became available. On August 12, MacArthur issued CINCFE Operation Plan 100-B and specifically named the Inchon-Seoul area as the target that an extraordinary invasion force would seize by amphibious assault. MacArthur began planning and preparation with a scheduled cell located in his GHQ staff; forces earmarked for the operation were to be placed in GHQ Reserve as they became available.
On August 26, MacArthur pleaded and subsequently received the permission to activate a Corps Headquarters, X Corps, as the operational unit to carry out the mission. On the same particular day, he elected his Chief of Staff, Major General Almond, to command the corps. The major ground units of X Corps were to be the 1st Marine Division, commanded by Major General Oliver P. Smith whereas the 7th Infantry Division was to be commanded by Major General David G. Barr.
These 1st Marines were in the United States and had to be swiftly and silently outfitted and transported to the theater of operational activities. General Smith was given less than three weeks to get his Division ready, and at the last moment was given an additional replacement regiment composed of recruits and a battalion of Marines extracted from duty in the Mediterranean.
The 7th Infantry Division that was stationed in Japan at the time was undermanned, being at about half the strength of the other troops. Its ranks had been thinned over the preceding few months to provide trained replacements for the 24th as well as the 2nd Infantry Divisions in Korea. As a strategic measure, more than 8,000 Korean recruits were sent to Japan to reinforce the 7th Infantry Division. Acclimating, integrating, and training these recruits was begun in a desperate hurry.
While MacArthur never wavered in his commitment to the Inchon plan, circumstances forced a series of postponements. Since and after the beginning of the war on June 25, the Korean Northern Army had forced ROK and the U.S. Forces to withdraw nearly 150 miles south. This positioning separated and delegated the Han River to act as at defensive position on the southern tip of the Korean peninsula which was commonly referred to as the "Pusan Perimeter.”
Stopping this advance had absorbed every sailor, airman, and soldier that MacArthur could recruit
During the late days of August 1950, the top ranking command department also had problems—exploiting this victories and successes was proving to be challenging. With most of its forces delegated tasks deep in South Korea, North Korea’s primitive (though efficient) supply system was overstretched. Especially troublesome was the inability of the North Korean Army to clothe and feed its soldiers. By the 1st day of September, many units experienced trouble while feeding their troops more than one meal per day. With wint...