Cold Warrior Bias and Applebaum’s Comments on Ukraine (Essay Sample)

Cold Warrior Bias and Applebaum’s Comments on Ukraine Student’s Name Institutional Affiliation Course Code and Name Professor’s Name Due Date Cold Warrior Bias and Applebaum’s Understanding of Ukraine Commentary Applebaum makes a number of statements in the article “Ukraine Must Win” which demonstrate a worldview based around moral absolutism which is reflective of her personal biases. The author demonstrates a clear bias in favor of unconditional and unlimited support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia and views the conflict as a clash of civilizations. As a journalist, Applebaum has a breadth of knowledge to draw from. She has written extensively about the region and so is rightly considered an expert on Russia in particular and Eastern Europe generally. However, Applebaum’s position as a journalist born during the Cold War means that she is subject to biases which must be interrogated if her argument is to be weighed fairly. The war between Russia and Ukraine has already had implications for people around the world, many of whom are citizens of neither country. Applebaum’s argument should be understood within context so that they not imbue readers with undue bias. Cold-War Bias Applebaum views the contemporary conflict through the lens of past conflicts between Russia and Ukraine and actions taken by Russian leaders during the twentieth century. This is evidenced by the fact that she repeatedly refers to the past and present looking for points of comparison between past and contemporary Russia. At numerous times, Applebaum compares Russia’s current leadership with Joseph Stalin. In quoting from a statement from the Russian foreign minister, Applebaum suggests that Russia understands the conflict according to a “might makes right” understanding of the world. In the quote, the minister describes the conflict as being about the world order more than Ukraine itself (Applebaum, 2022). Though Applebaum likely has a very different vision for a desirable world order from that of the minister, in many ways they both see the world through the same bias. Each sees the conflict through the context of historicism. That is, the events in the present are connected with those in the past in an unbroken line. Applebaum, the foreign minister, and very likely Vladimir Putin see the current conflict in terms of Cold-War era politics. During the Cold War, geopolitics were set by adversarial superpowers which imposed their own visions on nations unrelated to the conflict. The Cold War was about ideas as much as militaries. And for those who lived through that conflict and were shaped by those experiences, the current war is too. The point of this direct comparison is to underline the serious threat that Russia poses not only to Ukraine but to the region. Stalin’s crimes against humanity are well known to members of the readership Applebaum is trying to appeal to, and the point is to use the collective memory of past terrors to justify support for Ukraine. But this is likely premature. To be sure, the Russian army has attacked civilians. This is deplorable. But they do not suggest that if Russia is victorious in Ukraine that it will threaten other countries, something which Applebaum claims (Applebaum, 2022, para. 9). The author quotes Ukrainian President Volodymir Zelensky who compared Putin with Hitler in a speech given in Germany. This again is a case of understanding a current conflict through the lens of a past one. But there is no evidence that Putin or the Russians who serve him are driven by the ideology of either Nazi Germany or Soviet Russia. The history of the twentieth century is coloring Applebaum’s interpretation of current events. This bias has potentially serious consequences, because implicit in it are a set of assumptions. By reading Cold War parallels into the present conflict between Ukraine and Russia, Applebaum is using the benefit of hindsight to predict future events. While it is certainly true that history can be a guide, it is not always a reliable one. The consequences of erroneously conflating the current war with World War II or other past conflicts between Russia and Ukraine could be dire for the citizens of both countries and others around the world. Because Applebaum subscribes to a Cold-War mentality, the same mentality that the Russian leaders have, it is easy for the author to lapse into a perspective which is concerned with the march of history and not the ordinary people who are swept up in the conflict. There are no individual Ukrainians mentioned in the essay. Instead, whole nations are personified. Russia, the West, Ukraine and so forth are not regions full of people with complicated identities and priorities which must be weighed and negotiated. This complexity is reduced for the sake or rhetoric. Russia is the aggressor, Ukraine its victim, and so on. This kind of rhetorical reductionism is perhaps inevitable when arguing a point, as no one can convey all of the complexities of a situation when making an argument. It is likely that Applebaum would argue that she is concerned primarily with the well-being of Ukraine and its people. However, by insisting that total victory is the only course, Applebaum is effectively writing individual Ukrainians out of the narrative she is constructing. To the author’s credit, Applebaum does not entirely omit reference to the wishes of the Ukrainians themselves. According to a poll cited in the essay, roughly nine out of ten Ukrainians believe the war against Russia to be winnable (Applebaum, 2022, para. 1). But believing that they are capable of victory and understanding what victory will actually require are two different things. At the time of Applebaum’s writing the war was only three weeks old (Applebaum, 2022, para. 2). The most destructive and violent phase of the conflict had not even begun at this point, and many more civilians have been subsequently killed with no end in sight at the time of this writing. If victory is the only acceptable outcome, as Applebaum argues that it is, this will undeniably cost lives. Every day the conflict continues without a resolution is an opportunity for someone on either side to lose their life. The exact number of lives spent in the pursuit of victory against Russia can only be speculated upon. But they must be greater than a negotiated cease-fire between the two powers. A treaty, even one with terms unfavorable to Ukraine would end the fighting. For Ukraine, the victim of aggression, to cede its territory would be humiliating and unfair. It would also, almost certainly, be life-saving. Those people, the lives which could be saved by a truce, are the ones being left out Applebaum’s consideration. The author would likely object to calling these people “collateral damage” and would blame Russia for their deaths, as well she should. But this does not change the facts. If Ukraine accepts less than victory, it would mean a sudden end to hostilities. This would mean that those people, both civilians and soldiers on both sides who would have died will instead have the chance to live. Theirs are the voices not being considered here. The choice to forego a chance of victory may be unpalatable, but this is the course of action which Applebaum urges readers of her essay not to consider. It is worth considering, if the loss of individual lives matters more than the narrative constructed around those lives. The Cold War bias that Applebaum displays can be dangerous because it has the tendency to reduce reality to a grand game no matter how assiduously subscribers to this worldview might resist this. Applebaum likely has empathetic concern for the people of Ukraine. But arguing that abstract concepts like nation states have responsibilities to history or civilization itself, ordinary people cannot help but fade into the backdrop. Journalistic/Class Bias As an American journalist, Applebaum has the privilege of viewing the conflict at a level of remove. The author can make recommendations about policy from first principles based on abstract concepts, particularly values. Journalists are knowledgeable individuals who are experts in their particular fields. Because they have more knowledge and understanding of the subjects they study, laypeople reasonably defer to them in matters which they themselves do not specialize in. However, journalists can be biased in their views precisely because of their extensive knowledge. As experts, they can be disposed to believe that they have a more complete understanding of reality than others do. This may be true, but it also means that it is difficult for journalists to be aware of their own implicit biases. Journalists, like everyone, can be influenced by their particular backgrounds. In particular, journalists are vulnerable to echo chambers. That is, they can have their own views reflected back at them by like-minded peers and may lose touch with dissenting views or alternative interpretations. They may also come to see the world through the filter of the institutions they themselves belong to. Applebaum’s audience is disposed to be sympathetic toward Ukraine. The author can use this sympathy to Applebaum can assume that most of her readers will be Westerners, particularly Americans. The Atlantic, where Applebaum’s essay was published, is an American publication with a long history of serious journalism. Its readers can be assumed to be reasonably affluent and well-educated since they have both the disposable income for a subscription, which is required once the number of articles free articles in a given month has been exceeded, and the leisure time to read for pleasure. Applebaum can assume that the readers of The Atlantic will hold many values in common. For instance, they will likely believe in the principles of self-determination, since this is a value broadly held by Americans in particular. As such, Applebaum can draw...