Thinking Critically about Military Issues: The Strategist (Essay Sample)

Thinking Critically about Military Issues: The Strategist
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Thinking Critically about Military Issues: The Strategist
Of all the Civil War commanders, the Confederate General Robert E. Lee is without doubt one of the most widely respected and one of the most iconic. Even though he was against secession, Robert E. Lee left his job in the United States Army to join the forces of his native state. He then rose to command the biggest Confederate army. General Robert E. Lee repeatedly trounced larger Union armies in the state of Virginia, although his last 2 invasions against the North were not successful (Crocker, 2013). This paper provides a discussion about General Robert E. Lee, a military leader in my area of interest. This selected military leader faced a strategic challenge during a time of conflict in Gettysburg in the year 1863.
The Confederate assault of 3rd July 1863, commonly referred to as Pickett’s Charge, is usually depicted by contemporary historians as an epic and colossal effort of military futility. To General Lee however, the Confederate attack was neither doomed to failure nor was it ill-conceived. After 2 days of intensive combat in the ridges and hills south of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, General Lee hurled his Army of Northern Virginia against the Union center anchored on Cemetery Ridge on the scorching afternoon of 3rd July, 1863 (Barra, 2012). Tactfully flawed but operationally brilliant, the campaign in Gettysburg constituted General Robert Lee’s concentrated and determined effort aimed at destroying the Union Army of the Potomac on Northern Soil. In essence, the strategic goal of General Robert Lee was to dishearten the Northern supporters of the war so that public opinion would pressurize the administration of President Abraham Lincoln to recognize the Confederate States of America and end the Civil War (Savage, 2014).
General Robert Lee’s Strategic Reassessment
Carter and Dozier (2014) stated that the war in Gettysburg started on 1st July 1863 as a meeting engagement when Union cavalry under the leadership of John Buford encountered Confederate infantry from Ambrose Hill’s corps on the ridges northwest of the small town of Gettysburg in central Pennsylvania. General Lee, hoping to make the most of his capacity to bring more reinforcements to the field before George Meade could counter in more strength, accepted the fight although, as he stated, he was marching blind because J.E.B. Stuart’s cavalry was absent (Carter & Dozier, 2014). It is of note that General Lee’s gamble on 1st July 1863 actually paid off as converging Confederate columns managed to smash 2 Union corps by late afternoon and the Union Army moved back to Cemetery Hill south of Gettysburg. On 2nd July 1863, General Robert Lee planned to attack both sides of the Army of the Potomac at the same time but he failed in coordinating the assaults.
Following some of the fiercest combating of the war, Meade maintained the high ground from Little Round Top through Cemetery Ridge to Culp’s Hill by the end of the day. Moreover, by the day’s end on July 2 1863, the dilemma that confronted General Robert Lee was knowing whether he had come up with a good strategy whose execution was poor, or whether the strategy itself was actually flawed (Field & Hook, 2010). As General Lee assessed the field, he came to believe that, had James Longstreet’s attack against Meade’s southern flank been coordinated with fellow corps commander Richard Ewell’s assault against the northern extremity of the Union line on Culp’s Hill, then the Confederates would have easily defeated the Army of the Potomac. Notwithstanding the lack of coordination, for which General Robert Lee should bear full responsibility, he had nearly attained success since the Army of Northern Virginia’s subordinate commanders at the division and brigade level were highly competent and the infantry was very skilled. Petruzzi (2013) pointed out that his army had almost penetrated the Union line on Cemetery Ridge in 2 places before the Union reinforcements and artillery exploited the interior lines thereby repelling the Confederate forces. General Robert Lee believed that if he could coordinate the assault the next day, July 3rd, he could actually force the Army of the Potomac out of the field. In addition, for the very first time in this fighting, he had his whole army on the field before the end of the second day, July 2nd. Stuart came back with his reduced horsemen by early evening and by late afternoon, George Pickett’s fresh division of about 4,480 Virginians arrived on the combat zone and was ready for action on 3rd July, 1863 (History, 2009).
In spite of General Robert Lee’s own admission that he was far less positive of his army’s likelihood of victory compared to the previous day, he still went ahead for battle when he actually did not have to and Longstreet had suggested a reasonable alternative to a frontal attack against the Army of the Potomac. The only imaginable reason as to why he chose to override James Longstreet’s suggestion to leave Gettysburg and battle a defensive war nearer to Washington, D. C., is that he thought his side would be victorious at Gettysburg (Kingseed, 2013). In the mind of General Robert Lee, the decision was never whether he would retreat or attack, or whether he would not stay or he would stay. He actually had those decisions the moment he agreed to the fighting on 1st July 1863. Only by offensive action could he accomplish his intention of destroying the Union Army and he would not move back whilst any opportunity for success remained (Kingseed, 2013). Understanding that the Southern states would never have an adequate amount of resources to mount a successive invasion against the Northern states and that time was in fact working against the Confederacy, General Robert Lee chose to assault again. In essence, General Lee was not playing to avoid defeat, but rather to win. For him to accomplish complete victory, he was ready to risk total defeat (Mowday, 2013).
General Robert Lee created the conditions for success
Having decided to remain on the battlefield and launch a major attack, General Robert Lee directed his efforts toward creating the conditions that were favorable to victory. At first, he placed James Longstreet in command of the general attack. Longstreet is considered to have been a poor choice given that he was strongly against the attack, although General Robert Lee thought that he was the best available corps commander now that Stonewall Jackson was dead (Kingseed, 2013). There was no other commander whom he would have picked to lead the attack other than Longstreet. The available alternatives who included Stuart, Hill, or Ewell had never proven their ability to match the ability of James Longstreet in delivering the hammer-like attack that was needed on the third day, 3rd July 1863.
Next, General Robert Lee directed a strong 2-hour artillery preparation aimed at softening the Union center before the infantry began its assault. Had the bombardment made by the Confederate torn down the Union artillery, then the infantry could have crossed the no-man’s land which divided the Confederate and the Union lines with negligible casualties. Moreover, General Robert Lee commanded Stuart to surround the Northern right flank and attack the Army of the Potomac’s rear (Rafuse, 2008). Under Brigadier Generals George Custer and David Gregg, the Union cavalry stopped Stuart’s assault 3 miles short of Cemetery Ridge, thereby fighting an extensive and strategically crucial battle. The fatigue of his horse and the casualties served to force Stuart to leave the field without accomplishing his goal and go back to the Confederate lines (Rafuse, 2008). Equally important, General Robert Lee used every available resource in the assault – 3 divisions of roughly 12, 000 men in total – and concentrated the attack against a short stretch of line along Cemetery Ridge. He also prepared 2 more brigades of infantry to support any infiltration of the Union line. It is of note that such as attack would have offered General Robert Lee numerical advantage at the point of assault (Mowday, 2013).
Looking back, General Robert Lee’s judgment appears flawed although his command method had always been to bring his army to the battlefield, create the conditions for success, and ...