Molyneux’s Problem with the Current Philosophy of Mind (Essay Sample)

Molyneux’s Problem with the Current Philosophy of Mind
Philosophical arguments of Molyneux’s problem with the current philosophy of mind exemplifies the debate that has been there since past motivated as mainly concentrated on the role intrinsically called rational cognitive faculties, amodal spatial concepts, and principles play in humans’ perceptual lives. Certainly, for the same motives, rationalists have supported an affirmative answer, whereas empiricists have based on negative answer, to Molyneux’s question following the presentation of his common though experiment. Further, the differences between some empiricist accounts have been broadly realized and argued amongst historians of philosophy on the topic at hand. Importantly, there is the necessity for interpreting John Locke’s arguments on Molyneux’s problem that effectively coheres with human understanding and with the major scientific view concerning the nature of perception when he was still living.
First, Locke’s negative answer to Molyneux’ question is prima facie inconsistent. In this regard, Locke’s negative and authorization of Molyneux’s explanation for it leads towards an essential interpretive difficulty. Based on Molyneux’s account, the reason the former blind man cannot show, which object is a cube and a sphere is that the relationships between humans’ ideas of figure attained through diverse sense of modalities need to be learned through experience. However, whereas such justification suits with the empiricist opinion that knowledge is inclined in experience and that the paths of all mental activities are naturally sensory. This claim implies that it is not compatible with the view that a person sees similar ideas through diverse senses. In that connection, Locke was dedicated to the doctrine that there exist those common sensible.