How Does Executive Power-Sharing Impact on Inter-Group Relations, Ethnic Conflicts, and Stability in Divided Societies? (Essay Sample)

How Does Executive Power-Sharing (Consociational Democracy) Impact on Inter-Group Relations and Ethnic Conflicts and Stability in Divided Societies?
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How Does Executive Power-Sharing (Consociational Democracy) Impact on Inter-Group Relations and Ethnic Conflicts and Stability in Divided Societies?
Executive power-sharing or consociational democracy is an institutional design tool where divided groups in society are represented by elites from the selected social groupings, who share power within the democratic region. Thus, each group is democratically represented by an elite leader. When a region is divided over its democratic ruling, a consociational democracy tries to unite the groups by allowing each group to have a representative-elect who shares power with the other representative or representatives. This paper analyzes how executive power-sharing or consociational democracy impacts inter-group relations and ethnic conflicts and divided societies' stability.
Options for the Design of a Consociational Democracy
There are three options for designing a consociational democracy. The first option is that the elites have to be motivated to engage in conflict regulation. Political institutions conforming to consociational democracy are primarily divided into multiple divisions based on ethnic, religious, or linguistic lines, making it challenging to balance power amongst each group. Elite powers representing each division have to be included in the consociational democracy to regulate conflicts arising in those regions during political engagements. Conflict regulation occurs when sharing political and military positions and re-engineering state institutions in ethnic power-sharing (Vandeginste, 2015).
The second option for the design of a consociational democracy is engaging the elites in leading deferential segments. Leading deferential segments involves choosing a majority leader from each segment. Suppose a state is divided within religious lines. In that case, a consociational democracy involves choosing leaders from each religious denomination. Each leader ought to lead their respective denomination but conform to the state's law, reducing domination and skepticism while increasing democratic bona fides (Linz, 1990).
The third option for designing a consociational democracy involves establishing a multiple balance of power amongst subcultures. This option is the most difficult because it is hard to balance power amongst all subcultures when the subcultural divisions are numerous and the region has a small population. Under such circumstances, political competition is rampant, forcing the integration of power-sharing leadership systems between the president, political systems, and society (Linz, 1990). For Burundi, power-sharing was much more comfortable after the coup because it involved two subcultures; the Hutu and the Tutsi. Thus, the balance of power reaped good benefits because it involved unconstitutional means of acceding power (Vandeginste, 2015).
Characteristics of a Consociational Democracy
A consociational democracy has two main characteristics. The first characteristic involves forming a democracy from a coalition of cabinets, where executive power is shared between parties and not concentrated in one. Therefore, if a country has multiple parties representing several segmental divisions present in that country, the consociational democracy allows each party to elect cabinets to be represented in the parliament or governance. This characteristic implies the presence of a proportional inclusion where the coalition cabinets take part in decision-making. The opposition party, moderates, and extremists will be represented inside the government under such circumstances (Haddad, 2009).
The second characteristic of a consociational democracy is that it incorporates incongruent bicameralism. Incongruent bicameralism is a condition where one party cannot gain a majority in both houses. Therefore, the lower house and the senate would be elected by different electoral systems, like the Australian senate. Having two houses at the senate balances the upper house and lower house's constitutional power and political capacity. Moreover, incongruent bicameralism reduces or controls conflicts amongst conflicting groups present in a state or country.